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I.

JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §
78A-3-102(4), and pursuant to the Order entered by the Utah Supreme Court dated
November 17, 2009, transferring this matter to this Court.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Issue: Defendants/Appellees Professional Title Services and Clay Holbrook assert
that the principal issue presented for review is whether the trial court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
Standard for review: Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the
appellate court "grant[s] no deference to the court below, but instead, 'the district court's
legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment are reviewed for
correctness.'" Barnes v. Clarkson, 2008 UT App 44, ]f 8, 178 P.3d 930 (quotingMassey
v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10,18, 152 P.3d 312). Additionally, in reviewing a grant of
summary judgment, the appellate court "view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Arnold Indus, v.
Love, 2002 UT 133, f 11, 63 P.3d 721 (quotingDCMInv. Corp. v. PinecrestInv. Co.,
2001UT91,P6,34P.3d785).
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III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Tonda Hampton (hereafter referred to as "Plaintiff or "Ms. Hampton")
filed her original complaint against Defendants on August 14, 2007 (R. 1). She
eventually filed her Third Amended Complaint on November 5, 2008 (R. 131), bringing
claims against Defendants for declaratory judgment, (R. 138), breach of contract (R.
140), breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing (R. 141), slander of title (R. 142),
negligence (R. 143), and fraud (R. 144). The factual allegations in Plaintiffs Third
Amended Complaint pertain to transactions involving parcels of real property in Carbon
County, Utah: one parcel of approximately 4,000 acres (R. 134), and one parcel of
approximately 6.32 acres with a residence (R. 134). Essentially, Plaintiff alleges that she
owned those parcels together with Kim Jensen (whom she refers to as K.C. Jensen or her
"Joint Tenant"), but that her name was "fraudulently" removed from the title to the
properties. (R. 133-138). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Professional Title Services
and Clay Holbrook assisted Kim Jensen with the transactions wherein Plaintiff lost her
interest in the properties. (R. 133-138).
In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she entered into an oral
agreement with Clay Holbrook wherein she would "relinquish her rights" in the 6.32
acres parcel of property by selling that property to Defendants for $21,185.47. (R. 136 at
Tf 31). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Clay Holbrook refused to finalize the transaction,
and thereby breached their oral agreement. (R. 13 6-13 8, 140-142).
Plaintiff was given ample time and opportunity to conduct discovery. The first
scheduling order was entered on June 13, 2008, providing that fact discovery should be
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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completed by October 31, 2008 (R. 76-77). After Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the
scheduling order, a second scheduling order was entered on August 11, 2008, providing
that fact discovery would end on December 2, 2008. (R. 84-86, 92-93). A third
scheduling order was entered on March 9, 2009, providing that fact discovery should be
completed by July 10, 2009. (R. 157-158). During the course of discovery, Plaintiff
served various discovery requests, to which Defendants responded and provided at least
668 pages of documents pertaining to the underlying transactions. (R. 81-83, 97, 149,
172, 174, 233). Plaintiff had ample time and opportunity to conduct discovery, she
served several discovery requests, and in response to such discovery requests she
received hundreds of pages of documentation pertaining to the real property transactions
she put at issue in her Third Amended Complaint.
After the close of fact discovery (pursuant to the deadline in the third amended
scheduling order), Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment. (R. 235; see
also Addendum 1 at p. 29). Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment, and an affidavit supporting her memorandum. (R. 377-503; see also
Addendum 7 and 8 at pp. 105-130). She attached several documents to her affidavit,
most of which had been produced by Defendants. (R. 401-503). However, neither her
memorandum in opposition nor her affidavit made any attempt to controvert the
statement of undisputed facts as set forth in Defendants' memorandum. (R. 377-400). A
hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was held on September 21, 2009.
(R. 547; see also Addendum 9 at pp. 131-168). During the hearing, Judge Thomas heard
oral argument from both parties, and asked Plaintiff several questions regarding her
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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claims and contentions. (R. 547 at pages 13-28; see also Addendum 9 at pp. 135-150)1.
As a result of the briefs and the hearing, the trial court granted Defendants' motion. The
Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was entered on October 8, 2009,
granting summary judgment to Defendants on all of Plaintiff s claims. (R. 533-541; see
also Addendum "A" to the Brief of Appellant). Plaintiff then filed this appeal.
IV.
1.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Plaintiff Tonda Hampton (hereafter referred to as "Plaintiff or "Hampton")

filed a lawsuit against Kim Jensen in the Seventh District Court on November 10, 1999,
case number 994700340 (referred to hereafter as the "1999 Suit."). (R. 240, 258-276).
2.

In conjunction with the 1999 Suit, Plaintiff recorded several lis pendens

against parcels of real property, as follows:
a. Recorded on November 15, 1999, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office,
as Entry No. 77489, against approximately 4,078.61 acres of real property
(R. 240, 280-282; see Addendum 2(a) at p. 41);
b. Recorded on February 4, 2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as
Entry No. 78686, against two parcels of property, together with all rights of
access, grazing rights, and water rights (R. 241, 283-284; see Addendum
2(b) at p. 44);
c. Recorded on March 31, 2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as
Entry No. 79477, against two parcels of property, together with all rights of

Only the first page of the transcript of the hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was marked as
part of the record, number 547. Therefore, references to the transcript of the summary judgment hearing will refer
to the number marked as the record, 547, followed by individual pages as identified in the transcript.
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access, grazing rights, and water rights (R. 241, 285-286; see Addendum
2(c) at p. 46);
d. Recorded on March 31, 2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as
Entry No. 79478, against approximately 4,078.61 acres of real property (R.
241, 287-289; see Addendum 2(d) at p. 48).
3.

Two of the lis pendens specifically state, "The Petitioner [Ms. Hampton]

claims marital interest or a partnership interest in the above-described lands, this being
the object of the action." (R. 241, 286, 289; see Addendum 2 at pp. 47, 50).
4.

On January 23, 2002, the Seventh Judicial District Court, Judge Scott N.

Johansen, entered a stipulated order in the 1999 Suit requiring Ms. Hampton to release
her lis pendens as to two specific parcels so those parcels could be sold to third parties
(R. 290-312; see Addendum 3): (1) the Ghost Town Guest Ranch Lodge, consisting of
approximately 6.37 acres) (hereafter referred to as "House Parcel"); (2) a total of 675
acres west of Helper, Utah (hereafter referred to as "Vacant Parcel"). (R. 241, 290-293;
see Addendum 3 at pp. 58-61).
5.

The Stipulated Order of the 1999 Suit provided that the lis pendens was to

remain in effect with respect to the remainder of the property. (R. 242, 294).
6.

The Stipulated Order also ordered that the two parcels be sold, and after the

payment of certain expenses, the proceeds from the sale should be "deposited into an
interest bearing trust account, set up by counsel for [Tonda Hampton and Kim Jensen],
with both signatures required for disbursements, which funds are to be distributed as the
Court orders and as the parties might agree." (R. 242, 294 at ]f 8).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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7.

Defendant Professional Title Services was retained as the closing and

escrow agent for the sales of the two parcels. (R. 242, 313-317).
8.

At the time Professional Title Services became involved, the Home Parcel

was under contract to sell to Leo Foy and Clayton Foy for $200,000.00. (R. 242, 314 at
HH 4-7).
9.

The Vacant Parcel was also under contract to sell to Leo Foy and Clayton

Foy, for aprice of $135,000.00. (R. 242, 314 at Tf|f 4-7).
10.

Defendants had no involvement in the negotiation of the two contracts, but

was only involved to act as closing and escrow agent for the transaction. (R. 242, 314 at
17).
11.

The two transactions took approximately two months from when

Professional Title Services was retained until the transactions closed in January, 2002.
During that time period, Defendant Clay Holbrook ("Holbrook"), the President of
Professional Title Services, was in communication with Richard Golden, the attorney for
Kim Jensen, and Douglas Stowell, the attorney for Tonda Hampton. (R. 242, 314 at ^f 9).
12.

Before the transactions closed, Holbrook was informed by both Richard

Golden and Douglas Stowell that the parties had agreed to escrow the proceeds from the
sales, and that the parties' agreement would be entered as an order of the Court. (R. 243,
315 at If 10).
13.

The transactions both closed on January 25, 2002. (R. 243, 315 at f 10,

318-321).
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14.

The settlement statement from the sale of the House Parcel shows that the

proceeds from the sale, after deducting payments for loans and other costs, were
$42,060.94. (R. 243, 315 at 112, 318).
15.

The settlement statement for the Vacant Parcel shows that the proceeds

from the sale, after deducting payments for loans and other costs, were $40,466.15. (R.
243, 315 atH 13, 320).
16.

After the transactions closed and the funds were received by Professional

Title Services, Holbrook caused the proceeds to be distributed as required by the Court.
(R. 243, 315 at 114).
17.

The proceeds from the sale of the Vacant Parcel, in the amount of

$40,466.15, were distributed by way of a check from Professional Title Services to
Richard R. Golden and Douglas Stowell, the attorneys for Kim Jensen and Tonda
Hampton, dated January 29, 2002. (R. 243, 315 at If 15, 322).
18.

The proceeds from the sale of the House Parcel, in the amount of

$42,060.94, were distributed by way of a check from Professional Title Services to
Richard R. Golden and Douglas Stowell, the attorneys for Kim Jensen and Tonda
Hampton, dated January 29, 2002. (R. 243, 315-316 at 116, 323).
19.

Professional Title Services was only retained to act as closing and escrow

agent, and once the checks were issued to the two attorneys, neither Professional Title
Services nor Clay Holbrook had further involvement. Neither Professional Title Services
nor Clay Holbrook has any knowledge of what happened to the proceeds once the
attorneys received them, or how the proceeds were distributed. (R. 244, 316 at ^ 17).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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20.

On December 13, 2002, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen

and Double J. Triangle, LLC, in the Seventh Judicial District Court, case number
020701072 ("2002 Suit"). (R. 244, 325-328, 363-364; see Addendum 5 at p. 90).
21.

In conjunction with the 2002 Suit, Plaintiff recorded a lis pendens against

many of the same parcels at issue in the 1999 Suit and identified on the lis pendens
recorded in the 1999 Suit ("2002 Lis Pendens"). (R. 244, 280-289, 329-331; see
Addendum 2 at page 51).
22.

The 2002 Lis Pendens is signed by Plaintiff, and states, "During this case, a

Lis Pendens need [sic] to be in place. To protect the Real Estate involved. Respondent
[Kim Jensen] has been depleting, hiding, transferring, out of Petitioners [sic] name,
Fraudulently." (R. 244, 331; see Addendum 2 at p. 53).
23.

On January 6, 2003, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen in

the Seventh Judicial District Court, case number 030700004 ("2003 Suit"). (R. 244, 332336, 366-367; see Addendum 5 at p. 93).
24.

In conjunction with the 2003 suit, Plaintiff filed a lis pendens against many

of the same properties identified in the lis pendens of the 1999 Suit ("2003 Lis Pendens").
(R. 245, 337-339; see Addendum 2 at p. 54).
25.

On April 23, 2004, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen in the

Seventh Judicial District Court, as case number 040700256 ("2004 Suit"). (R. 245, 340342; see Addendum 4 at p. 65).
26.

In the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff named Kim Jensen and Richard Golden, a former

attorney of Kim Jensen, as defendants. (R. 245, 340).
10
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27.

In the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff alleged that an "Interest Bearing Trust Account"

was established, referring to the Stipulated Order entered in the 1999 Suit on January 23,
2002. (R. 245, 340). Plaintiff also alleged that the "trust account no longer exists." (R.
245,340).
28.

Also in the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff alleged that Kim Jensen "has now sold all of

our other Carbon County Real estate," and "Defendants [sic] True Records will show that
Petitioner [Tonda Hampton] has never given any oral or written document to allow any
ownership change on approx. 4,000 acre[s, w]hich are at issue." (R. 245, 341; see
Addendum 4 at p. 67).
29.

In response to Plaintiffs complaint filed in the 2004 Suit, Kim Jensen filed

a motion to dismiss, and a memorandum in support. (R. 245, 343-372; see Addendum 5).
30.

The motion to dismiss and memorandum in support filed by Kim Jensen in

the 2004 Suit asserted the defense of res judicata and set forth the history of Plaintiff s
various lawsuits filed against Kim Jensen. (R. 245, 345-347). The memorandum
contains as exhibits various court pleadings that have since been destroyed by the
Seventh Judicial District Court (R. 245-246):
a. Exhibit I to the memorandum is the Order, Findings, and Conclusions for
the 1999 Case, holding that Tonda Hampton and Kim Jensen did not have a
common law marriage, dismissing the 1999 Suit with prejudice, and
ordering the lis pendens filed by Tonda Hampton against all real property to
be released (R. 246, 352-361; see Addendum 5 at pp. 80-89);
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b. Exhibit II is the complaint in the 2002 Suit, containing allegations that the
real property should be divided (R. 246, 362-364; see Addendum 5 at pp.
90-92);
c. Exhibit III is the complaint in the 2003 Suit, alleging that Kim Jensen had
"sold and hidden" real property, and asking the Court to "reverse
ownership" of the real property and other assets (R. 246, 365-367; see
Addendum 5 at pp. 93-95);
d. Exhibit IV is a ruling in the 2002 Suit and the 2003 Suit (which cases were
apparently consolidated), dismissing the claims pertaining to the real
property, and ordering the lis pendens filed by Plaintiff to be released. (R.
246, 368-372; see Addendum 5 at pp. 96-99).
31.

In response to the motion to dismiss filed by Kim Jensen in the 2004 Suit,

the Seventh Judicial District Court granted the motion and entered an order on September
13, 2006, dismissing the 2004 Suit on the ground that the 2004 Suit was barred due to the
doctrine of res judicata ("2004 Order"). (R. 246, 373-376; see Addendum 6).
32.

Plaintiff filed this action against these Defendants on August 14, 2007. (R.

1, 246). Plaintiff filed her Third Amended Complaint on November 5, 2008, bringing
allegations regarding the real property that was litigated in the 1999 Suit, the 2002 Suit,
the 2003 Suit, and the 2004 Suit. (R. 131-148, 246-247) Plaintiffs requested relief asks
for, "[a] declaratory judgment concerning real property titled in plaintiffs name and to
the, Water Rights, Hunting rights and BLM leases to be shown as Discovery unfolds; [b]
injunction for Defendants to correct all mistakes concerning all real estate interests, water
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rights, hunting rights and not limited to BLM Leases. Plaintiff is willing to be
compensated at fair Market value as of approximately 2007 or 2008 all Plaintiffs interest
have been depleted from her ownership to be shown as discovery unfolds." (Id.)
33.

In approximately July of 2007, Plaintiff contacted Clay Holbrook with

questions regarding the sales of the two parcels and the distribution of the proceeds. (R.
247,316).
34.

In an effort to avoid litigation, Holbrook made a settlement offer to Plaintiff

to resolve all claims and prepared a proposed settlement agreement. (R. 247, 316, 658).
35.

Ms. Hampton did not agree to the proposed settlement agreement as

prepared by Mr. Holbrook, but instead stated that she would only accept the amount
offered by Mr. Holbrook as payment for the House Parcel, and that she intended to
pursue the remaining claims pertaining to the Vacant Parcel. (R. 247, 316).
36.

In her Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that she entered into an

agreement with Defendants whereby Defendants would purchase her interest in the
House Parcel. (R. 136 at 131).
37.

During the summary judgment hearing, Plaintiff stated that the intent of the

alleged oral agreement was for Defendants to purchase her interest in the House Parcel:
THE COURT:
Okay. What were the terms, do you believe?
MS. HAMPTON: The terms were to—I would relinquish my
rights, basically, it was all stated on a document he typed up, everything
was legit on August 27th, so all those terms in that August 27th disclaimer, I
believe would be correct, to my belief, and it's all listed in the disclaimer.
Those are the terms where I would relinquish my rights to the error of title
of 6.31 acres for the value of—consideration of 21,185.47.
(R. 547 at page 22; see Addendum 9 at p. 144).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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THE COURT: —there is a reasonable basis to find there is a
disputed fact regarding the existence of an oral contract. And—and I'm
looking to see what you believed the terms of the oral contract were and
where that—where that document is—why you believe those terms are
accurate, the basis for what you believe those terms are.
MS. HAMPTON: The basis, he agreed to pay the money to
relinquish my rights of my titled ownership that the company erred in. I
don't believe I have the—a document to show that at this time.
THE COURT: Okay. So, there's no document that shows what the
terms of that agreement were; is that correct?
MS. HAMPTON: Not at this time—
(R. 547 at page 23; see Addendum 9 at p. 145).
THE COURT: Yeah. In other words, the terms of a contract would
be, you know, the~the things that go to the heart of the agreement. In other
words, there would be a payment, you allege, of twenty-one thousand
some-odd dollars in exchange for what? What—what-what were the terms
of the-of the oral agreement from your perspective?
MS. HAMPTON: He would pay me the $21,185.47 to relinquish my
rights to a deed of 6.32 acres. That was a discussion and an agreement we
came to.
THE COURT: So, it was~it was totally to relinquish rights to a
deed? That's all it was?
MS. HAMPTON: To relinquish my rights to a deed, one deed of
6.32 acres.
THE COURT: Okay. So, essentially, your oral agreement was the
payment would be made to relinquish the rights in land. Is that what you'reMS. HAMPTON: Yes.
THE COURT: -is that what you're telling me?
MS. HAMPTON: It was land, real property.
THE COURT: So, ma'am, is it your assertion that it was not in the
nature of a settlement agreement?
MS. HAMPTON: No.
THE COURT: It was not in the nature of a settlement agreement?
MS. HAMPTON: No. The~
THE COURT: But rather was for payment for an interest in land. Is
that what you're asserting? I want to make sure I understand this, ma'am.
MS. HAMPTON: Correct.
(R. 547 at pages 24-25; see Addendum 9 at pp. 146-147).
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V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Although Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment raised several legal
theories, there is only one issue relevant to this appeal: whether the trial court properly
granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Defendants assert that the trial court
properly granted the motion.
First, the undisputed facts as presented by Defendants were not controverted by
Plaintiff. The affidavit and documents presented by Plaintiff in her memorandum in
opposition did not have any information sufficient to raise issues of fact. In her appellate
brief, Plaintiff makes various arguments that the trial court did not allow her to present
evidence. However, this matter was decided on summary judgment so Plaintiff had every
opportunity to present evidence in her briefings and at the hearing on Defendants'
motion. Plaintiff conducted significant discovery, but the documents and information
presented in her opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment failed to create
issues of fact. Accordingly, the facts presented by Defendants were undisputed by
Plaintiff.
Second, the trial court was correct in ruling that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff has filed several
lawsuits pertaining to her ownership interest in the real properties at issue in this matter.
Plaintiff brought the 1999 Suit, the 2002 Suit, the 2003 Suit, and the 2004 Suit against
Kim Jensen alleging that Plaintiff owned interests in real property, and that Kim Jensen
had "fraudulently" removed Plaintiffs name from the title to the properties. In those
lawsuits, Plaintiff filed lis pendens against the same real property that is at issue in this
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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matter. The undisputed facts demonstrate that all of those cases were resolved against
Plaintiff, with the trial courts ordering Plaintiff to release the lis pendens, and ruling that
Plaintiff had no interest in those properties. Plaintiff brought this matter naming
Defendants as parties rather than Kim Jensen, but her allegations are the same as the
other lawsuits. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims are barred by res judicata.
Third, the trial court was correct in ruling that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the
statute of limitations. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff did not file her
complaint against Defendants until August 14, 2007. However, Plaintiff was aware of
the facts and circumstances pertaining to her allegations beginning as early as the 1999
Suit. Defendants acted as closing agent for the transaction that took place in January,
2002. After the transaction closed, Defendants wrote a check to the attorneys for Plaintiff
and Kim Jensen for the amount of the final proceeds resulting from the transaction. After
that point, Defendants had no further involvement. Plaintiff then brought lawsuits in
2002, 2003, and 2004, raising the same allegations that have been brought in this matter.
Therefore, it is apparent that Plaintiff had knowledge of the facts and circumstances
underlying her allegations, and the statute of limitations on her claims ran well before
August, 2007, when she filed her action against Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.
Fourth, Plaintiffs claims of an oral agreement are barred by the statute of frauds.
In her Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that the alleged oral agreement was
intended to "relinquish [her] rights" in the House Parcel. At the hearing on Defendants'
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff clarified that the oral agreement was for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Defendants to purchase her interest in the House Parcel, yet she also admitted that there
was no written agreement, and she presented no signed, written agreement together with
her opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, because
Plaintiff has asserted an oral agreement for the purchase of an interest in real property,
her claims based upon the alleged oral agreement are barred by the statute of frauds.
VI.

ARGUMENT - THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANTS

The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, as
Plaintiff did not dispute Defendants' statements of fact, and the undisputed facts
demonstrate that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The facts of
the case and the law are clear that Plaintiffs' claims are barred due to res judicata, the
statute of limitations, and the statute of frauds.
A,

Plaintiff failed to dispute Defendants' statement of
facts

Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. "When the moving party has
presented evidence sufficient to support a judgment in its favor, and the opposing party
fails to submit contrary evidence, a trial court is justified in concluding that no genuine
issue of fact is present or would be at trial." Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health
Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, ]f 40, 70 P.3d 904 (quoting Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler,
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768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct.App.1989)). Finally, "An affidavit that merely reflects the
affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions is insufficient to create an issue of
fact." Id, at \ 50 (quoting Dairy Prod, Servs, v. City ofWellsville, 2000 UT 81 at \ 54, 13
P.3d581).
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require that in opposing a motion for summary
judgment, "[f]or each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party
shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to
relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials." Rule 7(c)(3)(B) U.R.C.P..
Plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment
failed to controvert any of Defendants' statements of fact. (R. 377-400; see Addendum 7
and 8 at pp. 105-130). In opposing Defendants' motion, Plaintiff did not respond to any
of Defendants' facts, but instead, she only discussed unsubstantiated allegations.
Although Plaintiff identifies documents that supposedly support her allegations, there is
no indication in any of the documents provided by Plaintiff that she disputed any facts
raised by Defendants. The issues presented by Defendants pertained to res judicata and
the statutes of limitations. The facts (or allegations) raised by Plaintiff were not relevant
to the issues raised by Defendants, and would have no bearing on the decision by the
Court. Therefore, Defendants' statement of facts were undisputed by Plaintiff.
In the Brief of Appellant, Plaintiff summarily asserts that "the evidence does not
support the court's ruling that [of] res judicata," and the "court improperly prevented
Plaintiffs evidence of fraud issues." See Brief of Appellant at page 12, items LA. and
ID. In another part of her brief, Plaintiff states, "Had the court simply allowed Plaintiff
18
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to introduce her evidence to this case [sic] would have clearly been in Plaintiffs [sic]
favor and exposed Defendants' misleading intent." See Brief of Appellant at page 10.
However, Plaintiff makes those statements without providing any supporting arguments
or citations to the record. She does not indicate what evidence she was prevented from
introducing, or even what evidence supports her allegations of fraud.
The proceeding below was a motion for summary judgment. The record
demonstrates that Plaintiff conducted significant discovery and Defendants produced
hundreds of pages of documents in response to Plaintiffs discovery. Defendants brought
a motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff had every opportunity to present her
evidence in her briefings in opposition to Defendants' motion and at the hearing.
Plaintiff failed to dispute Defendants' statement of facts as presented in their motion for
summary judgment, so it was appropriate for the trial court to make a ruling as a matter
of law as to the issues presented by Defendants.
B,

The trial court properly granted summary
judgment as to the issue of res judicata

Res judicata encompasses two distinct doctrines: claim preclusion and issue
preclusion. Pride Stables v. Homestead Golf Club, Inc., 2003 UT App 411, \ 14, 82 P.3d
198. "[Cjlaim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent action a claim
that has been fully litigated previously," and involves three elements:
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit
or be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third,
the first suit must have resulted in afinaljudgment on the merits.
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Id. at U 15 (quoting Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, If 34, 73 P.3d 325).
Defendants recognize that they were not parties to the previous suits filed by Tonda
Hampton, so claim preclusion would not be applicable. However, the doctrine of issue
preclusion does bar Plaintiffs claims.
Issue preclusion "arises from a different cause of action and prevents parties or
their privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in
the first suit." Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13,1f 35, 73 P.3d 325 (quoting
Maoris & Assocs.f Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ^ 19, 16 P.3d 1214). Issue
preclusion requires four elements:
(i) [T]he party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a
party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in
the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action must have been
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have
resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Id. (quoting Collins v. Sandy City Bd. ofAdjustment, 2002 UT 77, f 12, 52 P.3d 1267).
Plaintiff filed four separate and distinct lawsuits for the purpose of adjudicating title to
the properties at question in this suit: the 1999 Suit {see supra Section IV. Statement of
the Facts (hereafter "Facts" or "Fact") 1-5, 30(a)), the 2002 Suit {see Facts 20-22, 30(b,
d); see Addendum 5 at p. 90), the 2003 Suit {see Facts 23-24, 30(c-d); see Addendum 5 at
p. 93), and the 2004 Suit {see Facts 25-31; see Addendum 5 at p. 65). Therefore, the first
element is met, as Plaintiff was the same party in the prior suits.
In each of the aforementioned suits, Plaintiff brought claims asserting her interest
in the real properties at issue in this case. See id. Specifically, Plaintiff filed lis pendens
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in the 1999 Suit, the 2002 Suit, and the 2003 Suit. See id.; see also Addendum 2. The
issues in this case are identical to the issues in the prior cases: Plaintiff is asserting that
she has a right in or title to various parcels of real property. Although in the prior cases
she was asserting the claim against a different party, it is evident that she lost those cases,
and so is trying to find a new party against whom to bring her grievances. However, the
issues are identical, so the second element of issue preclusion is met.
The previous suits were completely, fairly, and fully litigated. The dockets and
the pleadings of the prior cases demonstrate that Plaintiff was represented by various
attorneys, filed several motions, and had every opportunity to present her case to the
Court. See generally Facts 1-6, 20-31.
Finally, the previous suits resulted in final judgments on the merits. The first was
the Stipulated Order from the 1999 Suit entered on January 23, 2002. See Fact 4; see
Addendum 3. In the Stipulated Order, the parties agreed, and the Court ordered, that the
properties would be sold and the proceeds would be put in escrow. See Facts 4-6.
Defendant Professional Title Services was retained to conduct the closing, and on
January 29, 2002, Defendant transmitted the proceeds to the attorneys for Kim Jensen
and Tonda Hampton. See Facts 7-19. Accordingly, Defendants complied with their
obligations, and the proceeds were distributed directly to Plaintiffs counsel. Plaintiffs
remaining claims to the other parcels of property were dismissed by a final order of the
Court, wherein the Court found that Plaintiff and Kim Jensen did not have a common law
marriage, and therefore ordered the lis pendens filed in the 1999 Suit to be released. See
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Fact No. 30(a); see Addendum 5 at pp. 80-89. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims in the 1999
Suit were fully adjudicated.
The claims in the other suits were also fully adjudicated. The 2002 Suit and the
2003 Suit ended with a final order of the Court dismissing Plaintiffs property claims and
ordering the lis pendens to be released. See Fact 30(d); see Addendum 5 at p. 96. The
2004 Suit also resulted in a final order on the merits, once again dismissing Plaintiffs
claims wherein she asserted an interest in the property through a partnership agreement.
See Fact 31; see Addendum 6 at p. 100. Accordingly, the fourth element of issue
preclusion is met, as Plaintiffs claims in the prior suits all resulted in final judgments on
the merits.
Plaintiff has already attempted, multiple times, to claim an interest in the real
properties that are the subject of this suit. Each time, a judgment was entered against
Plaintiff, or Plaintiffs claims were dismissed on the merits. Plaintiffs suits against Kim
Jensen have failed, and she has sued these Defendants to attempt to find a party to pay
her for property that the Seventh District Court has already declared never belonged to
her. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims have already been fully litigated in previous suits,
and the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the
ground that Plaintiffs claims are barred due to the doctrine of res judicata.
C.

The trial court properly granted summary
judgment as to the issue of the statute of limitations

Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint brings causes of action for declaratory
judgment, breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, slander
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of title, negligence, and fraud. The statute of limitations for fraud claims is three years
from the discovery of the fraud. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(3). The statute of
limitation is four years for all other claims raised by Plaintiff. See Utah Code Ann. §
78B-2-307 ("An action may be brought within four years .. . for relief not otherwise
provided for by law.").
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff filed suit against Kim Jensen on
November 10, 1999, and recorded a lis pendens against the parcels of real property at
issue in this matter as early as November 15, 1999. See Facts 1-3. The properties at
issue were sold on January 25, 2002 (with Defendants acting as the closing agent for that
transaction), and Defendants distributed the proceeds of the sale to counsel for Plaintiff
on January 29, 2002. See Facts 6-18. Accordingly, Plaintiff or her counsel were
involved in litigation asserting an interest in title to the parcels of real property, and when
they were sold, the proceeds were distributed to Plaintiffs attorney on January 29, 2002.
Therefore, any cause of action regarding title to the real properties, and Defendants'
involvement in the sale of those properties, began to run at the latest on January 29, 2002.
Because the statute of limitations on all actions other than fraud is 4 years, (and the
statute of limitations for fraud is only 3 years), the statute of limitations on Plaintiffs
claims expired in January, 2006. Plaintiff did not file her initial complaint in this matter
until August, 2007. See Fact 32. Accordingly, Plaintiff filed her complaint after the
statute of limitations had run, and Plaintiffs claims are barred.
In the Brief of Appellant, Plaintiff has argued that the "fraudulent concealment"
doctrine prevented the running and expiration of the statutes of limitations. See Brief of
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Appellant at 11-13. As a general rule, a statute of limitations begins to run "upon the
happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Colosimo v.
Roman Catholic Bishop, 2007 UT 25,114, 156 P.3d 806 (quoting Russell Packard Dev.,
Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ^ 20, 108 P.3d 741). An exception to that general rule is the
discovery rule, which operates to toll a statute of limitation "until the discovery of facts
forming the basis for the cause of action." Id. at ^j 15 (quoting Carson, 2005 UT 14, ^ 21,
108 P.3d 741). The discovery rule only applies if "provided for by statute (the 'statutory
discovery rule')" or "when required by equity (the 'equitable discovery rule')." Id. The
equitable discovery rule may be applied "when either exceptional circumstances or the
defendant's fraudulent concealment prevents the plaintiff from timely filing suit." Id.
In the Colosimo case, the Supreme Court clarified the knowledge requirement in
the context of the discovery rule:
A plaintiff is deemed to have discovered his action when he has
actual knowledge of the fraud "or by reasonable diligence and inquiry
should know, the relevant facts of the fraud perpetrated against him." We
have particularly emphasized the importance of the diligence requirement,
stating that "[a] party who has opportunity of knowing the facts constituting
the alleged fraud cannot be inactive and afterwards allege a want of
knowledge" and that "[a] party is required to make inquiry if his findings
would prompt further investigation." In other words, if a party has
knowledge of some underlying facts, then that party must reasonably
investigate potential causes of action because the limitations period will
run.
Id. at 1| 17 (quoting Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1196 (Utah 1993)). In this case, it
is not necessary to discuss whether the statutory discovery rule or the equitable discovery
rule apply, because the allegations and pleadings filed by Plaintiff in conjunction with the
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2002 Suit, the 2003 Suit, and the 2004 Suit clearly demonstrate that Plaintiff had
knowledge of the facts underlying the alleged fraud when she filed those suits.
In conjunction with the 2002 Suit, Plaintiff executed and caused to be recorded a
lis pendens on December 19, 2002. See Fact 21 (R. 329-331; see Addendum 2 at p. 51).
On the 2002 lis pendens, Plaintiff states, "During this case, a Lis Pendens need [sic] to be
in place. To protect the Real Estate involved. Respondent [Kim Jensen] has been
depleting, hiding, transferring, out of Petitioners [sic] name, Fraudulently." Fact 22 (R.
331; see Addendum 2 at p. 53). Therefore, as early as December 19, 2002, Plaintiff
asserted that properties were being fraudulently transferred out of her name. Those are
the same allegations, and pertain to the same parcels of property, that are at issue in this
matter. The facts also demonstrate that Plaintiff raised those same issues in the 2003 Suit
and the 2004 Suit. See Facts 23-31.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff had knowledge of the facts
underlying the alleged fraud as early as December 19, 2002, and the statute of limitations
on all claims began to run at that time by at least that time (if not before), expiring well
before August, 2007, when Plaintiff brought her complaint against Defendants.
Therefore, because Plaintiff did not file her complaint against Defendants until August,
2007, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants on the issue of
the statute of limitations.
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D,

The trial court properly granted summary
judgment as to the issue of the alleged oral
agreement

In her Third Amended Complaint, and at the hearing on Defendants' motion for
summary judgment, Plaintiff asserted that the terms of the alleged oral agreement
provided that Defendants would pay a sum of money to Plaintiff, in exchange for which
Plaintiff would convey her interest in the House Parcel to Defendants. See Facts 33-37.
An oral agreement for an interest in land is barred by the statute of frauds.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 provides as follows:
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting,
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent
thereunto authorized by writing.
Plaintiffs alleged oral agreement clearly falls within the statute of frauds.
Plaintiff asserted that Defendants agreed to purchase her interest in the House Parcel. An
agreement of that nature is clearly an agreement for the purchase of an "interest in real
property." Accordingly, because there is no writing, the agreement is barred pursuant to
the statute of frauds, and the trial court properly granted Defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the issue of Plaintiff s oral agreement.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Defendants assert that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor
of Defendants for the following reasons:

26
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(A)

Plaintiff failed to dispute Defendants' statement of facts; the documents and

arguments presented by Plaintiff in her opposition did not create a material issue of fact,
pertaining to res judicata, the statute of limitations, or the statute of frauds; because the
proceeding before the trial court was a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff had every
opportunity to present evidence in opposition to Defendants' motion, therefore her
arguments that the trial judge "prevented testimony" is not correct;
(B)

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata; Plaintiff

brought several suits (in 1999, 2002, 2003, and 2004), asserting that she had wrongfully
lost her interests in real property, and all those cases were decided on the merits against
Plaintiff, so her claims are barred pursuant to res judicata;
(C)

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statutes of limitations; the previous suits

filed by Plaintiff demonstrate that she had knowledge of the facts underlying her
allegations in this action as early as December, 2002, so the statute of limitations ran by
at least December, 2006, long before Plaintiffs complaint was filed in August, 2007;
(D)

Plaintiffs allegation of an oral agreement is barred by the statute of frauds;

Plaintiff asserted that Defendants had agreed to purchase her interest in the House Parcel,
and such a verbal agreement for the purchase of an interest in land is clearly barred by the
statute of frauds.
For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants request that this Court affirm the trial
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
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Dated this 13th day of April, 2010
HIRSCHI STEELE & BAER, PLLC
/s/ Justin R. Baer
Justin R. Baer
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of April, 2010,1 caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLEES' BRIEF to be mailed via First Class U.S. Mail, to
the following:
Tonda Lynn Hampton
P.O. Box 586
Price, UT 84501

/s/ Justin R. Baer
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Attorneys for Defendants
Professional Title Services and
Clay Holbrook

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON,
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
PROFESSIONAL TITLE SERVICES, etal.,

Case No.:

Defendants.

070700813

Judge: Douglas B. Thomas

Defendants Professional Title Services and Clay Holbrook, by and through their
attorneys, pursuant to Rule 7 U.R.C.P., hereby submit their Memorandum in Support of their
Motion for Summary Judgment
I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff has brought this matter asserting mat she should be compensated for the alleged
loss of real property. She asserts that Defendants were involved in the transfers of the property
out of her name, and that Defendants are therefore liable for fraud, negligence, slander of title,

l
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and other causes of action. However, the facts of this case demonstrate that Plaintiff has already
adjudicated the status of the title to the real property at issue, and this Court has already decided
this issue against Plaintiff.
In 1999, Plaintiff sued Kim Jensen, asserting that a common law marriage existed. In
conjunction with the lawsuit, Plaintiff filed various lis pendens and amended lis pendens against
more than 4,000 acres of real property, many of which Plaintiff has asserted are now at issue in
this case. In the course of the lawsuit filed in 1999, Plaintiff and Kim Jensen were ordered to sell
multiple parcels of the property at issue. Defendants were retained to act as closing and escrow
agent for the transactions. At the completion of the transactions, Defendants transmitted the
proceeds to the attorneys for Kim Jensen and for Plaintiff. Therefore, Defendants fulfilled their
duties, and the facts clearly demonstrate that Defendants provided the funds from the
transactions to Plaintiffs counsel, jointly with the counsel for Kim Jensen.
Ultimately, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs 1999 lawsuit, finding that a common law
marriage did not exist, and the Court ordered Plaintiff to release the lis pendens that had been
filed. However, that did not satisfy Plaintiff, and she filed another lawsuit in 2002, and a third
lawsuit in 2003. In conjunction with both suits, she filed more lis pendens, asserting that she was
entitled to title of the real property at issue. Those two cases were consolidated, and in a ruling
in April, 2003, this Court entered another order dismissing Plaintiffs claims, and ordering the lis
pendens to be released. However, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit in 2004, which was also
dismissed by this Court.

000231
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Having had all her complaints against Kim Jensen dismissed, Plaintiff has now filed this
action against these Defendants, but her causes of action have not changed. She continues to
assert that she is entitled to ownership of the parcels of real property that were at issue in the
previous suits. The facts of this case demonstrate that Plaintiff has wrongfully abused the
judicial process, and not only should her complaint be dismissed, but the Court should award
these Defendants their attorney's fees for Plaintiffs bad faith in bringing this action.
H.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

For the purposes of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment only, Defendant asserts
that the following facts are undisputed:
1.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Kim C. Jensen in this Court on November 10,

1999, case number 994700340 (referred to hereafter as the "1999 Suit."). The docket is attached
hereto as Exhibit A.
2.

Although Defendants have attempted to obtain copies of the pleadings in the 1999

Suit, Plaintiff does not have copies and the Court has destroyed its file. See Plaintiffs Responses
to Defendants' Requests for Production, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
3.

In conjunction with the 1999 Suit, Plaintiff recorded several lis pendens against

parcels of real property, as follows:
a. Recorded on November 15,1999, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as
Entry No. 77489, against approximately 4,078.61 acres of real property, attached
hereto as Exhibit C;

in
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(")

b. Recorded on February 4, 2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as Entry
No. 78686, against two parcels of property, together with all rights of access,
grazing rights, and water rights, attached hereto as Exhibit D;
c. Recorded on March 31,2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as Entry
No. 79477, against two parcels of property, together with all rights of access,
grazing rights, and water rights, attached hereto as Exhibit E;
d. Recorded on March 31,2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as Entry
No. 79478, against approximately 4,078.61 acres of real property, attached hereto
as Exhibit F.
4.

The lis pendens attached as Exhibits E and F appear to be amendments to those lis

pendens attached hereto as Exhibits D and C, respectively. Compare Exhibits C, D, E, and F.
5.

The lis pendens attached as Exhibits E and F specifically state, "The Petitioner

claims marital interest or a partnership interest in the above-described lands, this being the object
of the action." See Exhibit E at page 2; see also Exhibit F at page 3.
6.

In a Stipulated Order of this Court dated January 23, 2002, entered on that date in

the 1999 Suit, the Court ordered that the lis pendens be released as to two separate parcels: (1)
the Ghost Town Guest Ranch Lodge, consisting of approximately 6.37 acres (also identified as
Parcel No. 9 on the lis pendens attached as Exhibit F) (hereafter referred to as "House Parcel");
(2) a total of 675 acres west of Helper, Utah (also identified as Parcel No. 10 and portions of
Parcel No. 8 on the lis pendens attached as Exhibit F) (hereafter referred to as "Vacant Parcel.").
See Stipulated Order, attached hereto as Exhibit G, at pages 3 to 4.

iv
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The Stipulated Order of the 1999 Suit provided that the lis pendens was to remain

in effect with respect to the remainder of the property. See Stipulated Order (Exhibit G) at page
5.
8.

The Stipulated Order also ordered that the two parcels be sold, and that the

proceeds from the sale be deposited into an interest bearing trust account, set up by the attorneys
for Tonda Hampton and Kim Jensen, which funds were to be distributed by further order from
the Court or as the parties might agree. See Stipulated Order (Exhibit G) at 5,1f 8.
9.

Defendant Professional Title Services was retained as the closing and escrow

agent for the sales of the two parcels. See Affidavit of Clay G. Holbrook ("Holbrook Aff"),
attached hereto as Exhibit H.
10.

At the time Professional Title Services became involved, the Home Parcel was

under contract to sell to Leo Foy and Clayton Foy for $200,000.00. Id.
11.

The Vacant Parcel was also under contract to sell to Leo Foy and Clayton Foy, for

a price of $135,000.00. Id.
12.

Professional Title Services had no involvement in the negotiation of the two

contracts, but was only involved to act as closing and escrow agent for the transaction. Id.
13.

The two transactions took approximately two months from when Professional

Title Services was retained until the transactions closed in January, 2002. During that time
period, Defendant Clay Holbrook ("Holbrook"), the President of Professional Title Services, was
in communication with Richard Golden, the attorney for Kim Jensen, and Douglas Stowell, the
attorney for Tonda Hampton. Id.
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Holbrook was informed by both Richard Golden and Douglas Stowell that the

parties had agreed to escrow the proceeds from the sales, and that the parties' agreement would
be entered as an order of the Court. Id.
15.

The transactions both closed on January 25,2002. The settlement statement for

the House Parcel is attached to Holbrook's Affidavit as Exhibit 1. The settlement statement for
the Vacant Parcel is attached to Holbrook's Affidavit as Exhibit 2.
16.

The settlement statement for the House Parcel shows that the proceeds from the

sale, after deducting payments for loans and other costs, were $42,060.94. See Holbrook Aff. at
Exhibit 1.
17.

The settlement statement for the Vacant Parcel shows that the proceeds from the

sale, after deducting payments for loans and other costs, were $40,466.15. See id at Exhibit 2.
18.

After the transactions closed and the funds were received by Professional Title

Services, Holbrook caused the proceeds to be distributed as required by the Court. Id.
19.

The proceeds from the sale of the Vacant Parcel, in the amount of $40,466.15,

were distributed by way of a check from Professional Title Services to Richard R. Golden and
Douglas Stowell, the attorneys for Kim Jensen and Tonda Hampton, dated January 29,2002. A
copy of the check from the bank is attached to Holbrook's Affidavit as Exhibit 3.
20.

The proceeds from the sale of the House Parcel, in the amount of $42,060.94,

were distributed by way of a check from Professional Title Services to Richard R. Golden and
Douglas Stowell, the attorneys for Kim Jensen and Tonda Hampton, dated January 29,2002. A
copy of the check from the bank is attached to Holbrook's Affidavit as Exhibit 4.
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21.

Professional Title Services was only retained to act as closing and escrow agent,

and once the checks were issued to the two attorneys, neither Professional Title Services nor
Clay Holbrook had further involvement. Neither Professional Title Services nor Clay Holbrook
has any knowledge of what happened to the proceeds once the attorneys received them, or how
the proceeds were distributed. See Holbrook Aff.
22.

On December 13, 2002, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen and

Double J. Triangle, LLC in this Court, case number 020701072 ("2002 Suit"). See Docket,
attached hereto as Exhibit I.
23.

Although Defendants have attempted to obtain copies of the pleadings filed in the

2002 Suit, Plaintiff does not have copies and the Court has destroyed its file. See Plaintiffs
Responses to Defendants' Requests for Production, attached hereto as Exhibit B.
24.

In conjunction with the 2002 Suit, Plaintiff recorded a lis pendens against many of

the same parcels identified on the lis pendens attached as Exhibits E and F ("2002 Lis Pendens").
A copy of the 2002 Lis Pendens is attached hereto as Exhibit J.
25.

The 2002 Lis Pendens is signed by Plaintiff, and states, "During this case, a Lis

Pendens need [sic] to be in place. To protect the Real Estate involved. Respondent [Kim
Jensen] has been depleting, hiding, transferring, out of Petitioners [sic] name, Fraudulently." See
Exhibit J at 3.
26.

On January 6,2003, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen in this

Court, case number 030700004 ("2003 Suit"). A copy of the docket is attached hereto as Exhibit
K.

vh
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27.

In conjunction with the 2003 suit, Plaintiff filed a lis pendens against many of the

same properties identified in the lis pendens of the 1999 Suit. A copy of the 2003 Lis Pendens is
attached hereto as Exhibit L.
28.

On April 23, 2004, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen in this

Court, as case number 040700256 ("2004 Suit"). A copy of Plaintiff s Complaint is attached
hereto as Exhibit M.
29.

In the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff names Kim Jensen and Richard Golden, a former

attorney of Kim Jensen, as defendants. See Exhibit M.
30.

In the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff alleged that an "Interest Bearing Trust Account" was

established, and cited the Stipulated Order entered in the 1999 Suit on January 23, 2002 (which
Stipulated Order is attached hereto as Exhibit G). See Exhibit M at f 4., Plaintiff also alleged
that the "trust account no longer exists." Id. at f 6.
31.

Also in the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff alleged that Kim Jensen "has now sold all of our

other Carbon County Real estate," and "Defendants True Records will show that Petitioner
[Tonda Hampton] has never given any oral or written document to allow any ownership change
on approx. 4,000 acre[s, w]hich are at issue." Id. atfflf8-10.
32.

In response to Plaintiffs complaint filed in the 2004 suit, Kim Jensen filed a

motion to dismiss, and a memorandum in support. The motion and memorandum, along with all
attachments, are attached hereto as Exhibit N.
33.

The motion to dismiss and memorandum in support asserted the defense of res

judicata, and set forth the history of Plaintiff s various lawsuits filed against Kim Jensen. See
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Exhibit N. The memorandum contains as exhibits various court pleadings that have since been
destroyed by the Court:
a. Exhibit I is the Order, Findings, and Conclusions for the 1999 Case, holding that
Tonda Hampton and Kim Jensen did not have a common law marriage,
dismissing the 1999 Suit with prejudice, and ordering the lis pendens filed by
Tonda Hampton against all real property to be released;
b. Exhibit II is the complaint in the 2002 Suit, containing allegations that the real
property should be divided;
c. Exhibit III is the complaint in the 2003 Suit, alleging that Kim Jensen had "sold
and hidden" real property, and asking the Court to "reverse ownership" of the real
property and other assets;
d. Exhibit IV is a ruling in the 2002 Suit and the 2003 Suit (which cases were
apparently consolidated), dismissing the claims pertaining to the real property,
and ordering the lis pendens filed by Plaintiff to be released.
34,

In response to the motion to dismiss of the 2004 Suit, the Court granted the

motion, and entered an order on September 13,2006, dismissing the 2004 Suit on the ground that
the 2004 Suit was barred due to the doctrine of res judicata ("2004 Order"). The 2004 Order is
attached hereto as Exhibit O.
35.

Plaintiff filed this action against these Defendants on August 14, 2007. See case

docket. Plaintiff filed her Third Amended Complaint on November 5, 2008, bringing allegations
regarding the real property that was litigated in the 1999 Suit, the 2002 Suit, the 2003 Suit, and
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the 2004 Suit. Plaintiffs requested relief asks for, "[a] declaratory judgment concerning real
property titled in plaintiff name and to the, Water Rights, Hunting rights and BLM leases to be
shown as Discovery unfolds; [b] injunction for Defendants' to correct all mistakes concerning all
real estate interest, water rights, hunting rights and not limited to BLM Leases. Plaintiff is
willing to be compensate at fair Market value as of approximately 2007 or 2008 all Plaintiffs
interest have been depleted from her ownership to be shown as discovery unfolds," See
Plaintiff s Third Amended Complaint at 13.
36. ' In approximately July of 2007, Plaintiff contacted Clay Holbrook with, questions
regarding the sales of the two parcels and the distribution of the proceeds. After some written
and verbal correspondence with Ms. Hampton, Mr. Holbrook learned of the complaint that had
been filed in this matter in August, 2007. See Holbrook Aff.
37.

In an effort to avoid litigation, Holbrook made a settlement offer to Plaintiff to

resolve all claims, and prepared a proposed settlement agreement, a copy of which is attached to
Holbrook's Affidavit as Exhibit 5.
38.

Although the settlement offer was intended to resolve all claims, Ms. Hampton

stated that she would only accept that amount as payment for the House Parcel, and that she
intended to pursue the remaining claims pertaining to the Vacant Parcel. See Holbrook Aff.
39.

Because Ms. Hampton would not accept the offer as full resolution of all claims

in this suit, the settlement was not completed. See Holbrook Aff.
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SHRHWHURHJCX ~ COUNTY OF CflRBON
1939 NOV 15 1S:56 PK FEE *52,00 BY
REOEST: S C H I N D L E R ^ E

JOHN E SCHINDLER [3619]
Attorney for Petitioner
80 West Main, Suite 201
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (435)637-1783
FAX (435) 637-5269

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TONDA LYNN HAMPTON JENSEN,
Petitioner,

LIS PENDENS

vs.

Civil No.: 994700340

KIM C. JENSEN,

Judge: Bruce K. Halliday
Respondent j

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on or about the 10th day of November, 1999, suit
was commenced in the District Court for Carbon County, State of LJtah, involving the
above-named parties and the real properties'described below, situated in Carbon County,
State of Utah:
Parcel No. 1, SN - 2A0807-001 (40 acres):
SE1/4 SE 1/4 SEC. 2, T13S, RBE.SLM.
Parcel No. 2 - SN --2A-0826 (80 acres)
SE4NE4, NE4NE4 OF'SEC 11, T135, R8E, SLM
Parcel No. 3 - SN 2A-0827 (200 acres):
N 1/2 SW1/4, NW 1/4 SE 1/4, SW1/4 NE 1/4, SE 1/4 N W
1/4 f SEC12,T13S,R8E l SLM
" Page 1 of 3
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Parcel No. 4 - SN 2A -0831 {428.31 acres):
S2S2, N2N2, NE4SE4, N 990 FT OF SE4NE4, SW4NW4 OF
SEC 12, T13S, R8E, SLM. LESS 1.69 AC FOR RR R/W
Parcel No. 5 - SN 2A-0807 (480.29 acres):
NW4 & S2 OF SEC 1, T13S, RBE, SLM.
Parcel No. 6- SN 2A-080B (639.90 Acres):
ALL OF SEC 3, T13S, R8E, SLM
Parcel No. 7 - SN 2A-0809 (200 acres):
SE4, SE4NE4 OF SEC 4, T13S, R8E, SLM.
Parcel No. 8 - SN 2A-1036 (543.47 acres)r
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

LOTS 1,2, 3, 4; E2W2; W2NE4;SE4 OF SEC 7, T13S, R9E
SLM. ALSO, BEG 875 FT N & 825 FT W OF SE COR OF LOT
2,N39*30'W70FT;N40*E75FT;S39*30'E70FT;S40*W
75FTTOBEG. LESS 58 FT X 71 FT. LESS D&RG R/W
LESS, BEG 460 FT E OF SW COR OF SEC; N 78* 268.4 FT; N
12*W278FT;S85*W95FT;STOPT115.2FTNOFSL!NE;
S 78* W 127.5 FT; S 12* E 90 FT TO BEG. LESS PARCELS
DESCINQCDBK15 PG 827-10. 638, Less 21-1-36-1 (6.32
ac)
Parcel No. 9 - SN 2A-1036-01 (6,32 acres):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

BEG 250 FT N OF SE COR OF SW4NE4 OF SEC 7, T13S,
R9E, SLB&M;N 550 FT; W 550 FT; S 385 FT M/L TO N'LY
LINE OF D&RGW RR R/W; FLY ALG. N'LY R/W 325 FT
M/L TO PT LYING W 220 FT M/L FROM PT OF BEG; E
220 FT M/L TO PT OF BEG.

Parcel No. 10 - SN 2A-1060-D02 (428.96 acres):
'

LOTS1,2,3&4;E2SW4;E2NW4;W2NE4;NW4SE4 0F
SEC 18, T13S, R9E, SLB&H. LESS RR R/W
Page 2 of 3

C

C~l

O

CD

O
_

_.._..

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pTS000451

00028!

n
kMuimUdnU*

000774BS

BWXW45PgO0755

Parcel No. 11-SN2A-1057-002 (40 acres):
SW1/4 SW1/4, SEC 8, T13S, R9E, SLM
Parcel No. 12 - SN 2A-1031-004 (344.91 acres):
1
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

LOTS5 l 6 l 7,E2SW4,SW4SE4 0FSEC6,T13S,R9E,
SLB&H. ALSO, THOSE PORTIONS OF SE4SE4, NE4SE4,
SW4NE4, & SE4NW4 LYING SW1Y OF FOLLOWING
BNDRY LINE BEG AT A P T HALFWAY BETWEEN NE
COR OF SE4SE4 & SE COR OF SE4SE4, NWLY ON A
LINE INTERSECTING CENTER OF SUBDIVISION
BNDRYS THRU WHICH IT PASSES TO CENT OF N LINE
OFSE4NW4.

Parcel No. 13 - SN 2A-0310 (485.12 acres):
S % OF N 1/2; N % OF S 1/2; LOTS 1,2,3, 4; SEC 35, T12S,
R8E, SLM
Parcel No. 14 - SN 2A-307 (161.33 Acres):
LOTS 1,2; N % OF SE 1/4, SEC 34, T12S, RSE SLM

DATED this

/

5

day of /i/ffV

1999.

Jp>*N E. SCHINDLER
Attorney for Petitioner

myHe»Ueft»nTQftda\UftPeneJw\mo
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SfiRON WRDOGK - COUNTY OF CflHBGN
2000 F B M 13:01 PK F E $19.00 J V
SEOJE5T: SflMUEL CHIflSft

J0HNE.SCH1NDLER[3619]
Attorney for Petitioner
80 West Main, Suite 201
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (435) 637-1783
FAX: (435) 637-5269.

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

.';

TONDA LYNN HAMPTON JENSEN,
Petitioner,

vs.

"'
|

U S PENDENS

Civil No.: 994700340

KIM C.JENSEN,

Judge: Bruce K. Haliiday
Respondent.

',

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on or about the 10th day of November, 1899, suit
was commenced in the District Court for Carbon County, State of .Utah, involving the
above-named parties and the real properties described below, situated in Carbon County,
State of Utah:
Parcel No. 1, 00061313 Bk00392Pg00787-00787
Township 13 South, Range 8 East, salt Lake Base and
Meridian:
* / . (*7
"

Section 12: SE1/4 NW1/4; SW1/4 NE1/4; N % SW1/4; NW
1/4 SE 1/4
TOGETHER with all rights of access, grazingrights,or any
other rights which may be associated with or appurtenan.t to
said tends.
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TOGETHER with all water and water rights appurtenant to, or
in use on, said lands, including, but noUimited to, water rights
no. 91-3887 and 91-3643.
SUBJECT to current general taxes, reservations, restrictions
and easements existing or of record.
GRANTORS WARRANT that there has been no conveyance
or granting by them of any rights of access or ingress and
egress across, or associated with, said lands.
Parcel No. 2 -

00061-314 Bk00392 Pg00788-00788

Township 13 South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian:
Section 12: SE 1/4 NW1/4; SW1/4 NE 1/4; N % SW1/4;
NW1/4SE1/4
TOGETHER with all rights of access, grazing rights, or any
other rights which may be associated with or appurtenant to
said lands.
TOGETHER with all water and water rights appurtenant to, or
* in use on, said lands, including, but not limited to, water rights
• no. 91-328, 91-29, 91.-3887, 91-3690, 91-3543 and 91-107;
TOGETHER with all buildings, fixtures and improvements
thereon*and all water rights, rights of way, easements, rents,
issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges
and appurtenances thereunto now or hereafter' used or
enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof. •
DATED this

3.

. day-of

ilQHHE. SCHINDLER •
' F o r n e y for Petitioner

myfiies\JensenTortda\LfsPendens 3
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Fee:
14.00 Check
SHARON MJRD0CK, Recorder
Filed By JB
For SAMUEL P CHIARA
CARBON COUNTY CORPORATION

Samuel P. Chiara #7829
Attorney at Law
98 North 400 East
P.O. Box 955
Price, UT 84501
Telephone: (435) 637-7011
Fax: (435)636-0138
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON JENSEN,

LIS PENDENS

Petitioner,
vs.
KM C. JENSEN,
Respondent

Civil No.: 994700340
Judge: Scott N.Jbhansen

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on or about the 10* day of November, 1999,
suit was commenced in the District Court for Carbon County, State of Utah, involving the
•above-named parties and the real properties described below, situated hi Carbon County,
State of Utah:
Parcel No. 1: 00061313 Bk00392 Pg00787-00787
Township 13 South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian:
^

" Section 12: SE HNW lA; SW l/*NE fc;N fc SW V<; NW V. SE VA
TOGETHER with allrightsof access, grazingrights,or any other
rights which may be associated with or appurtenant to said lands.
TOGETHER with all water and waterrightsappurtenant to, or in
use on, said lands, including, but not limited to, waterrightsno.
91-3387 and 91-3643. .

*• sr sw-r-nrrrs

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

46

!

. .

.

.

.

(

J

462
SUBJECT to current general taxes, reservations, restrictions and
easements existing or of record.
GRANTORS WARRANT that there has been no conveyance or
granting by them of any rights of access or ingress and egress across, or
associated with, said lands.

!

Parcel No. 2: 00061314 Bk00392 Pg00788-00788Township 13 South, Range 8 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian:
Section 12; SE VA NW H; SW VA NE VA\ N V2 SW VA; NW VA SE VA
TOGETHER with allrightsof access, grazingrights,or any other
rights which may be associated with or appurtenant to said lands.
TOGETKDER with all water and waterrightsappurtenant to, or in use
on, said lands, including, but not limited to, water rights no. 91-328,
91-29,91-3887,91-3690,91-3643 and 91-107,
TOGETHER with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon
and all waterrights,rightsof way, easements, rents, issues, profits,
income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances
thereunto now or hereafter used or enjoyed with said property,, or any
part thereof.
The Petitioner claims marital interest or a partnership interest in the above-described
lands, this being the object-of the action.
DATED this

o\

day of

fTlcjr/^

, 2000.

\/VLs
Samuel P. Chiara
Attorney for Petitioner
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Samuel P. Chiara #7829
Attorney at Law
98 North 400 East
P.O. Box 955
Price, UT 84501
Telephone: (435) 637-7011
Fax: (435)636-0138
Attorney for Petitioner

Date 31-HAR-2000
l^Stm
Fee:
61.00 Check
SHARON MURC0CK, Recorder
F i l e d By JB
For SAMUEL P CHIflRA
CARBON COUNTY CORPORATION

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TOND A LYNN HAMPTON JENSEN,

LIS PENDENS

Petitioner,
vs*

• "

Civil No.: 994700340

KIM C. JENSEN,
Respondent

Judge: Scott N. Johansen

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on or about the 10* day of November, 1999, suit was
commenced in the District Court for Carbon County, State of Utah, involving the above-named
parties and 1he real properties described below, situated in Carbon County, State of Utah:
Parcel No. 1: SN-2A0807-001 (40 acres):
SE VA SE VA SEC. 2, T13S, R8E. SLM.

Parcel No. 2 - SN-2A-0826{80 acres):
SE4NE4,NE4NE4of SEC I1,T13S,R8E, SLM
Parcel No. 3 - SN 2A-0827 (200 acres):

N K SW Vi, NW VA SE'/«, SW VA NE VA, SE KNW lA, SEC 12,
T13S,R8E,SLM.
Parcel No. 4 - SN2A-0831 (428.31 acres):

PTS000461!
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S2S2, N2N2, NE4SE4, N 990 FT OF SE4NE4, SW4NW4 OF
SEC 12, T13S, R8E, SLM. LESS 1.69 AC FOR RR R/W,
Parcel No. 5 - SN2A-0807 (48*0.29 acres):
NW4 & S2 of SEC 1, T13S, R8E, SIM.
Parcel No. 6 - S N 21-0808 (639.90 acres):
ALL OF SEC 3, T13S, R8E, SLM.
Parcel No, 7 - SN 2A-809 (200 acres):
SE4, SE4NE4 OF SEC 4, T13S, R8E, SLM.
Parcel No. 8 - SN 2A-1Q36 (543.47 acres):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

LOTS 1,2,3,4; E2W2; W2NE4;SB4 OF SEC 7, T13S, R9E
SLM.ALSO,BEG875FTN&825FTWOFSECOROFLOT
2, N 39°30' W 70 FT; N 40° E 75 FT; S 39°30' E 70 FT; S 40° W
75 FT TO BEG. LESS 58 FT X 71 FT. LESS D&RGR/W
LESS, BEG 460 FT E OF SW COR OF SEC; N 78° 268.4 FT; N
12° W278 FT; S 85° W 95 FT; S TO PT 115.2 FTN OF S LINE;
S 78° W 127.5 FT; S 12° E 90 FT TO BEG. LESS PARCELS
DESC IN QCDBK15 PG 627-10. 638. Less 21-1-36-1 (6.32 •
ac)

Parcel No. 9 - SN 2A-1036-019632 acres):
1. BEG 250 FTN OF SE COR OF SW4NE4 OF SEC 7, T13S
*L R5E, SLB&M; N 550 FT; W 550 FT; S 385 FT M/L TO N'LY
3. LINEOFD&RGWRRRyW;E,LYALaN»LYRAV325FT
4. M/L TO PT LYING W 220 FT M/L FROM PT OF BEG; E
5. 220 FT M/L TO PT OF BEG.
Parcel No. 10 - SN 2A-1060-002 (428.96 acres);
LOTS 1,2,3 & 4; E2SW4; E2NW4; W2NE4 NW4 SE4 OF
SEC 18, T13S, R9E, SLB&M. LESS RR R/W
Parcel No. 11 - SN 2A-1057-0Q2 (40 acres):

£ 07947a B
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SW J/4 SW lA, SEC 8, T13S, R9E, SLM
Parcel No. 12 - SN 2A-1031-004 (344.91 acres):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8-

LOTS 5,6,7, E2SW4> SW4SE4 OF SEC 6, TI3S, R9E,
SLB&M. ALSO, THOSE PORTIONS OF SE4SE4, NE4SE4,
SW4NE4,&SE4NW4 LYING SW'LY OF FOLLOWING
BNDRY LINE BEG AT APT HALFWAY BETWEEN NE *
COR OF SE4SE4 & SE COR OF SE4SE4a NW'LY ON A
LINE INTERSECTING CENTER OF SUBDIVISION
BNDRY'S THRU WHICH IT PASSES TO CENT OF N LINE
OFSE4NW4.

Parcel No. 13 - SN 2A-0310 (485.12 acres):
S ¥x OF NlA; N Vz OF S lA\ LOTS 1,2,3,4; SEC 35, T12S,
R8E,SLM
ParcelNo. 14-SN2A-307 (161.33 acres):
LOTS 1,2; N Vi OF SE *At SEC 34, T12S, R8E SLM.
The Petitioner claims marital interest or a partnership interest in the above-described
lands, this being the object of the action.
DATED this 3\

day of

m&rd^

, 2000.'

Samuel P. Chiara
Attorney for Petitioner

Dwocce/Tonda Jensen Ik PendcnSLdoc
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Date "l^rcC-l&o!
___ 9sl5a»
Fee:
55.00 Cash

Tonda Lynn Hampton
Petitioner
Resident of Carbon CountyPrice, Utah 84501
Telephone: (435) 6374)201

SHARON HURDQCK, Recorder
F i l e d By KR
For TONDA LYNN HAMPTON
CARBON COUNTY CORPORATION

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Tonda Lynn Hampton
Petitioner,

Lis Pendens
CMKO,

Q±0<] Q[Q7JL

KIM Q JENSEN, OWNER OF
DOUBLE I TRIANGLE, LLC.
Respondent

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above mentioned names have had a Partnership,
involving Real Property, and that the Petitioner would like to dissolve all involve, and split all assets,
Real Property, and incomefromany and all basmesses.
Parcel:2A-0307-0000 Entry:015384
Lots 1 ^ N 1 / 2 of SEE 1/4; SEC 34, T12S, R8E. SIM
161.33 AC
Parcel:2A-0310-0000 Entry:
S 1/2 of N1/2; N1/2 of S1/2; Lots 1£;3;4; SEC 35, T12S, R8E, SLM.
Parcel:2A-08O7-OO00 Entry:077487
NW4&S2 0FSEC1,T13S,R8E,SIM 480.29 AC
parcel: 2A-0807-0001 Entry: 015605
SE1/4 SB 1/4 SEC. 2, T13S, R8E. SIM. 40.00 AC
parcel: 2A-0808-0000 Entry: 077487
ALLOFSEC.3,T13S,R8E,SIM 639.90 AC
parcel: 2A-0809-0000 Entry: 045678
SE4; SE4NE4 OF SEC. 4, T13S, R8E, SIM 200.00 AC
parcel: 2A-0826-0000 Entry: 000008
SE4NE4,NE4N£40FSEC11,T13S,R8E,SLM 80.00 AC
parcel: 2A-0829-0001 • Entry: 077487
SW4NW4,NE4NW4; SEC 12, T13S, R8E, SLB&M 141.22 AC
parcel:2A-0831-0000 Entry:008370

485.12 AC

' -ID
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S2S2; NW4NW4; NE4SE4. SEC 12, TBS, R8E, SLB&M. 280.87 AC
parcel: 2A-1031-0004 Entry:072274
LOTS 5,6,7, E2SW4, SW4SE4 OF SEC 6, T13S, R9E, SLB&M ALSO, THOSE
PORTIONS OF SE 4SE4, NE4SE4, NW4SE4, SW4NE4, & SE4NW4 LYING SWLY OF
FOLLOWING BNDRYLINE: BEGAT APT HALFWAY BETWEEN NE COR OF SE4SE4 &
SE COR OF SE4SE4, NWLY ON ALTNE INT ERSECTING CENTER OF SUBDIVISION
BNDRYS THRU WHICH LT PASSES TO CENT OF N LINE OF SE4NW4. 344.91 AC
parcel: 2A4036-0000 Entry: 065999
LOTS 1,2, E/2NW4; W2NE4 SEC 7, T13S, R9E, SLBM. LESS 2A-1036-2 (7.32 AC)
LESS PORTION S OF D&RGW RR R/W LESS PC 50 X1750 TO CARBON CO. LESS 2A1052 (.09 AC). 271.14 AC.
01/31/2002 04/29/2002
parcel: 2A-1057-0002 Entry: 075500
SW1/4 SW1/4, SEC 8, TBS, R9E, SLM. 40.00
parcel: 2A-0827-0000 Entry:
N1/2 SW 1/4, NW 1/4 SE V4, SW 1/4 NE 1/4, SE 1/4 NW1/4, SEC 12, TBS, R8E,
SLM. 2OO.00 AC
parcel: 2A-1060-0002 Entry: 089829
LOTS 1,2,3,& 4; E2SW4; E2NW4; W2NE4; NW4SE4 OF SEC 18, T13S, R9E, SLB&M
LESSRRR/W. 428.96 AC
parcel:2A-1036-0GO3 Entry:089829
No Recorder Notes Entered
THAT PORTION OF LOTS 3&4; SE4SW4; NE4SW4; W2SE4; E2NW4; W2NE4 LYING
SOUTH/SOUTHWESTERLY OF D&RGW RRR/W IN SEC 7, TBS, R9E, SLBM 24933
01B1Z2002 04/29.2002
parcel:2A-1036-0002 Entry:089828 '
BEG SE COR SW4NE4 SEC 7, TBS,

1. CarbtHiCoTmryRealProrKaly^

I £ C , l ^ C . Jensen, owner,

also Property known asaD of Spring Canyon Ranch, 6 nfles west ofHelper, Utah.
2. Summit County Real Property, lOacres apprcx. has been deleted and sold by the Respondent
3.Assets,
a. 1999 Ford 350 Diesel Truck, DOUBLE J. TB1ANGLE IXC. Kim C. lessen owner.
'
b. Other asserts amounting to over 200,000.00 dollars, Respondent has bean transferring sod selling,
4. Business income,
a. Bed & Breakfast, known as Spring Canyon Ghost Town Guest Ranch, lac. (Now, known, as Double I.
Triangle. LLC. Owner Kim C Jensen.
5. Business,
a. CWMU Private Hunting Unit Respondent has kept 100% of income at this lime.
6. Cattfe leases,
a. Respondent has kept all income at this time.
% 7. "Water Rights,
a. Nowtransfeaedinto the Double J. Triangle LLC, owner Kim C. Jensen.
8. Any and all Trust accounts since 19S3
9. BYUPropefly, located in Spring Canyon
10. Edward Evatz Property, locatedin Spring Canyon

E0 9 S 7 4 9
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o
11.
12.
13.
14.

o

Kim JenseaRevokafale Trust
AAAEaterprises, Triple A Entertainment Cinderella's Escort Service, Glass Slipper
Kim C. Jensen Family Limited Partnership
Airy and all other hidden accounts, companies, Trust notes.

Petitioner ask die Courts to bring this case forward and to resolve this dispute.
•During this case, a Lis Pendens need to be in place. To protect the Real Estate
involved. Respondent has been depleting, Mding, transfetmgj, out of Petitioners
name, Fraudulently.
(Evidence exist).

^Jsj^Vsr^
IN THE COUNTY OF

CARBON; STATE 0? UTAH, ON TEES 19TH DAY

OF DECEMBER 2002, BEFORE ME, THE UNDERSIGNED NOTARY,
PERSONALLY APPEARED

TONDA LYNN HAMPTON WHO PROVED TO ME

IDENTITY THROUGH DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IN THE FORM OP A.
UTAH DRIVERS LICENSE #147111801

TO BE THE PERSON WHO

SIGNED THE PRECEDING DOCUMENT IN MY PRESENCE. AND WHO
AFFIBMED TO ME THAT THE SIGNATURE IS VOLUNTARY AND THE
DOCUMENT TRUTHFUL.

NOTARY SIGNATURE AND SEAL

CONNIE CASE
HQTWPUBLIC *miEoIUTAH
120 EAST MAIN
PRICE, UT 84501
COMM. EXP. 9-28-2003

®
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Tonda Lynn Hampton
Petitioner
Resident of Carbon County
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (435) 637-0201

Fees
5 5 . 0 0 Cash
SHARON HURD0CK, Recorder
F i l e d By KR
For TONDft HAMPTON
CARBON COUHTY C0RP0RRTION

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Tonda Lynn Hampton
Petitioner,

Lis Pendens

vs.

CivilNo.:

KIM C. JENSEN, OWNER OF
DOUBLE L TRIANGLE, LLC.
Respondent

Judge:

Q'^OlfrOQOy

y.

NOTICE IS HEREB Y GIVEN fhat the above mentioned names have had a Partnership,
involving Real Property, and that the Petitioner would like to dissolve all involve, and split all
assets, Real Property, and income from any and all businesses. .
Parcel:2A-0307-0000 Entry:015384
Lotsl;2;Nl/2ofSEl/4;SEC34,T12S,R8E.SLM
161.33 AC
Parcel: 2A-0310-0000 Entry: '
.•
• *
S 1/2 of N1/2; N1/2 of S 1/2; Lots 1;2;3;4; SEC 35, T12S, R8E, SLMl 485.12 AC
Parcel:2A-0807-0000 Entry:077487
NW4&S2 0FSEC1,T13S,R8E,SLM. 480.29 AC
Parcel: 2A-0807-0001 Entry: 015605
SE1/4 SE1/4 SEC. 2, T13S, R8E. SIM. 40.00 AC
Parcel: 2A-0808-0000 Entry: 077487
ALLOFSEC.3,T13S,R8E,SLM. 639.90 AC
Parcel: 2A-0809-0000 Entry: 045678
SE4;SE4NE4 0FSEC.4,T13S,R8E,SLM. 200.00 AC
Parcel: 2A-0826-0000 Entry: 000008
SE4NE4,NE4NE4 0FSEC11,T13S,R8E,SLM 80.00 AC
Parcel: 2A-0829-0001 Entry: 077487
SW4NW4, NE4NW4; SEC 12, TBS, R8E, SLB&M. 141.22 AC
Parcel:2A-0831-0000 Entry:008370
S2S2;!NW4NW4;NE4SE4. SEC 12, T13S,R8E, SLB&M. 280.87 AC
Parcel:2A-1031-0004 Entry:072274
LOTS 5,6,7, E2SW4, SW4SE4 OF SEC 6, T13S, R9E, SLB&M. ALSO, THOSE

PTS000507!
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PORTIONS OF SE 4SE4, NE4SE4, NW4SE4, SW4NE4, & SE4NW4 LYING SWLY OF
FOLLOWING BNDRY LINE: BEG AT A PT HALFWAY BETWEEN NE COR OF SE4SE4 &
SE COR OF SE4SE4, NWLY ON A LINE INT ERSECTING CENTER OF SUBDIVISION
BNDRY'S THRU WHICH IT PASSES TO CENT OF N LINE OF SE4NW4. 344.91 AC
Parcel:2A-1036-0000 Entry:065999
LOTS 1,2, E/2NW4; W2NE4 SEC 7, T13S, R9E, SLBM. LESS 2A-1036-2 (7.32 AC)
LESS PORTION S OF D&RGW RR R/W LESS PC 50 X1750 TO CARBON CO. LESS 2A1052 (.09 AC). 271.14 AC.
01/31/2002 04/29/2002
Parcel:2A-1057-0002 Entry:075500
SW1/4 SW1/4, SEC 8, T13S, R9E, SLM. 40.00
Parcel: 2A-0827-0000 Entry:
N1/2 SW 1/4, NW 1/4 SE 1/4, SW 1/4 NE 1/4, SE 1/4 NW' 1/4, SEC 12, T13S, R8E,
SIM 2OO.00 AC
Parcel: 2A-1060-0002 Entry: 089829
LOTS U A & 4; E2SW4; E2NW4; W2NE4; NW4SE4 OF SEC 18., T13S, R9E,
SLB&M. LESSER R/W. 428.96 AC
Parcel: 2A-1036-0003 Entry: 089829
No Recorder Notes Entered
THAT PORTION OF LOTS 3&4; SE4SW4; NE4SW4; W2SE4; E2NW4; W2NE4 LYING
SOIJIH/SOUTHWESTERLY OF D&RGW RR R/W IN SEC 7, T13S, R9E, SLBM. 249.33
01/31/2002 04/29.2002
Parcel:2A-1036-0002 Entry:089828
BEG SE COR SW4NE4 SEC 7, T13S, R9E, SLB&M; N 800 FT; W 550 FT; S 385 FT
MfL TO N'LY LINE OF D&RGW RR R/W; E'LY & SE'LY ALNG SD R/W TO E LINE OF
NW4SE4 OF SD SEC 7; N ALNG SD E LINE TO BEG. 7.32 AC 01/31/2002
Parcel: 1A-1358-0000 Entry:082712
ALL OF LOTS 22,29 & 30, BLOCK 1, PLAT A, SHEYA ADD TO HELPER. 0.34 AC
Parcel: 1A-1371-0000 Entry: 082712
ALL OF LOTS 12,13, & 14, BLOCK 2, PLAT A, SHEYA ADD TO HELPER 0.34 AC

1. Carbon County Real Property, in the name of DOUBLE J. TRIANGLE LLC, KimC. Jensen,
owner, also Property known as all of Spring Canyon Ranch, 6 miles west ofHelper, Utah.
2. Summit County Real Property, 1 Oacres approx. has been depleted and sold by the Respondent
3. Assets,
a. 1999 Pord 350 Diesel Truck, DOUBLE J. TRIANGLE LLC. Kim C. Jensen owner.
b. Other assets amounting to over $200,000.00 dollars, Respondent has been transferring and selling.
4. Business income,
a. Bed & Breakfast, known as Spring Canyon Ghost Town Guest Ranch, Inc. (Now, known as Double J.
Triangle. LLC. Owner KimC. Jensen.
5. Business,
a. CWMU Private Hunting Unit Respondent has kept 100% of income at this time.
6. Cattle leases, .
a. Respondent has kept all income at this lime.
7. Water Rights,
a. Now transferred into the Double I. Triangle LLC, owner Kim C. Jensen.
S. Any and all Trust accounts since 1983

E0 9 5 9 9 S
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9. BYU Property, located m Spring Canyon
10. Edward Evatz Property, located in Spring Canyon
11. Kim Jensen Revokable Trust
12. AAAEnterprises, Triple A Entertainment, Cinderella's Escort Service, Glass Slipper
13. Kim C. Jensen Family Limited Partnership
14. Any and all other hidden accounts, companies, Trust notes.

Petitioner ask the Courts to bring this case forward and to resolve this dispute.

During this case, a Lis Pendens needs to be in place. To protect the Real Estate
involved. Respondent has been depleting, hiding, transferring, out of Petitioners
.name, Fraudulently.
(Evidence exists).

IN THE COUNTY OP CARBON, STATE OP UTAH, ON THIS 6th DAY OF JANUARY, 2003
BEFORE ME, THE UNDERSIGNED NOTARY, PERSONALLY APPEARED TONDA LYNN HAMPTON
WHO PROVED TO ME HER IDENTITY THROUGH DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE IN THE POEM OP
UTAH DRIVER LICENSE TO BE THE PERSON WHOSE NAME IS SIGNED ON THE PRECEDING
DOCUMENT, AND ACKNOWLEDGED TO ME TEAT SHE SIGNED IT VOLUNTARILY FOR ITS
STATED PURPOSE.

ALEXIS P. HORSLEY

mwpmiC'STffiottJM
120 EAST MAIN ST.
PRICE, UT 84501
COMM. EXP 7-1-2004

E 0 9 5 9 9 S B

531. P 4 0 4

PTS000509
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

56

I

00033$

ADDENDUM 3
Stipulated Order dated January 23, 2002
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FILED
JAN 2 3 2002
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS
KICHARD R. GOLDEN - 5957
McMTSSE & GOLDEN, L.C.
Attorney fot Respondeat.
360 East.4500 South, Suite 3
Salt-Lake Citys.Uiah 84107
Tfetejkme:. (801) 266-33.9$

£*3Saat
•S3S8S&*
Fees .•
69-00 Check •*•• •

SHAR8fcHURD0C&, Recorder '
.For PROFESSIONAL TITLE SERVICES'
CARBQH COUMTY CQRPORfiTIGH

INTHE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TOM)AHAMPTON-JENS^,.,
Petitioner,
vs.

STIPULATED
ORDER
ON
RESPONDENT'S MOTIONTOUFTOS
PENDENS ON PORTIONS OF
PROPERTT AND APPROVE SALE
CONDITIONS
. .

K3M& JENSEN, "
Respondent"

3
3J*
** i
^

Civil No.

994700340
994700327

Judge ScottN. Johansen

^<&

This matter came oh before the Court on December 7; 2001, as 3, telephonic hearing on.
Respondent9s'Ex Parte Motion to LiftPetitioiier's-Lis PendenSonPortions ofProperty and Approve
Sale Conditions'.-; Petitioner and her counsel, Douglas -Stowell were preseiat telephonically;
Rssjjohdenfs counsely 'Richard Golden, -;was.also present by telephone. The Court heasd the
arguments and proffers of counsel andhasreviewedihefilesin this matter. Based thereon andbeing
Silly advised, * the Court *kded"Respondenfs motioii should be grantedi, that is-the Petitioner's lis

PTS000481
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.

.

.

...

( )

pendens is to "be lifted-on'the property subjectto sale as ordered hereinind that said property be*sold
in accordance -with the terms'referred to inPetitioner'-s motion.
Subsequently, that sale couldriottake place because of the buyers5 inability to obtain an
•appraisal timely. As a'result; the'parties' stipulated regarding a delayed closing date and other
mattes, iandfiirfher agreed that the matter be cqmbined'-with'the Couit'sprevious-aondimcement-of
its order, all as follows:
1.

It'is in.the best interests ofthe parties that the real property at issue in Respondent's

motion be sold as requested by Respondent
2.

Petitioner's-Kspendens onsaidproperfyshpiddbeMedinorderto effectuate the sale

of said property •
3*.

Respondeat, through counsel has rqprese&tedto.fhe Court thafcfhe sale is abonafide,'

armVlength'tansasiion and.that neither Respondent nor Ms counsel is retaining any interest in the
. pk)^e^§^fladlortto*fltofl^ are no other agreements, writfcenor oral, between Respondent.or
.his'sttomey aiid the purchasers except those set forfh in the real prop'erty purchase agreements.
4.

Since. Shearing on this matter,' a- delay in closing has been requested by the buyers .

because they have been unable tofindan appraiser in time to close by the December 20,2001 date
originally set Thepartres, thrpughcdunselby their signatures approvingthis document have agreed
thafrclosing could be extended to on or before Jannary 20,200L
* 5.

Counsel for bothpaxdes, by approving tins Order, represent-to the Court that they do

notspecializeinreal property transactions and that neither counielmakes any representations to the

£ 0&^^Ar%
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Court, any party or any oth,ej:persbn:regardang-theproperiy descriptions in this Order; Rather the
property descriptions herein'are-based soMy-on descriptions provided by the real estate brokers or
titieinsiirance'compaides, copies of which have been provided to the Court.'
6,

' Itis in the best interests- of theparties that certain 'costs and expenses be paid out of

. the proceeds of-said sale, with the remainder placed in aninterest bearing trust account fer further
distebuiion as may be determined proper.

THEREFORE ITIS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.
pendens are:

The parcels of re&L property on which Respondent proposes to lift Petitioner's lis
. . .

*

t

(1) Ghost Town Guest RanchLo'dge ahd-1lie. 637 acres on which! it is located; Tax 3D #'2A1036-002, Carbon County, .state of Utah.

and
(2) Approximately'675 Acres rarest ofHelper, Utah:AllofCarbonCdimt5rtaxID#2A-10600002^ containing 42'8;9;6 acres more or less. All of1he property ownedby Double J TriangleLLCwMchfeinCaa^^
except for' that portion of the property-that is in.the east half of l i e south-east quarter of
Section 7 T13S; j&B;•coHfcaiftircg'approximately 246 acres. These.two 'parcels contain
approximately 675 acres more or less.'
2.

Fe&tionerVKs pendens ia the following described real.property is hereby ordered

released;
The real'jftoperiy to'be sold is described as follows; 7500 West Spring CanyonRoadj Helper,
'Uitah--84526y-joiore-particidarly described as follows:^

•

BEGINNIN&.^u-point-25
of the Southeast Cornex.of fhb\.Sontirwest
Quarter.ofIheNoriheast Quarter-of Section 73 Township" 13 South, Range-9East> Salt

E O a ? 8 4 l B. . 4 9 S - - P 2 . 6 9 " . XPTS000483
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. -Lake Base .and Meridian* ^draoiriiigraence North. 550 feet; thence Vest 500 feet;
thence 'South 385 feet, more pr less,, to the Northerly line of the D. & R.G.W.R.H
right of Way; thence Easterly-dongthe, said-Noxtberly right-of- way line 325-.feet,
more or less, to a point lying West 220 feet, more *or less,.from;the point of
beginning; thence;East 220 feet, more or less, to-the pomt of beginning.
' EXCEPTING tHerefrpm aU :oiL, gas add'otter minerals and mineral tights in and to
said lands.
Situate in Carbon Country, State of Utah. (Tax ID. # 2A4036-002)
and:-

.
THE SXJ^ACEiaGHTSONLYIN ANDTO THEFOIiQ-WIISfGLiESCEIBBD TRACTS
(DFLAND:
Township .13 -South, Range-9"East? Salt lake B&se and Meridian: . .
Section 7: : That portion of the following • described tracts of land lying
^ontttSotriiLwestexly of the cT)enver & Kio Grande "Western Raikoad "right
of way!3:
Lois'3 'and 4; SE1/4 SW1/4; NEi/4;SWl/4; Wl/2 SE1/4; El/2 NW 1/4;"
W1/2NE174 ' '
*
Section 18: Lots 1,2,3'and 4; El/2 S]Wl/4; Elffi NW1/4; W1/2NE1/4; NW1/4 SE1/4.

'

EXCEPTlNGfiom saidlands theinterests offhe'penver andRio GCTide-WesternRaiiroad
Company, acqnired under feat certain ieed recorded December. 20,1926, in Book 5-L of
Deeds at Page |99; as BntryNb'-12912.
EXCEPTINGfromsaidlands-all Rfflcbad Rights-ofWay.
. (TaxID,#2A4036and2A4060 r 2)situate'in Carbon County, State of Utah-

.•

See Exhibit A,'(Scbednle'Ato,comTriTtment-for M e insurance).
Jnaddition, two acrefeei-of water providedfrombfeerproperfy ownedby Double JTiiangle
r

* istobemclndedinme-sale.
4
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3.

Hie Hs pendens is to remain in effect with respect to the remainder of the property..

4.

Encumbrances on the teal'.property at issue in this -case should paid^xit of'the

proceeds ofthe sale., as-should the costs and expenses ofthe sale, including moving costs to remove
personal property, commissions and the costs of title insurance, if saeh any such costs -are
apportioned to'the seller. •
5.

•

Specifically, the mortgage indebtedness to Zion^s Bank on the property being sold

istobepddbffbytheproceeds-ofsaid^le:
6-

•

Indebtedness to EdEvatz on othsf portions ofthe Randhproperfyrathe approximate

amountof$3,900.00-is" also to be paid out of those proceeds.
7.

The Guardian ad IitenvGene Byrge, should be-paid $4,000.00 ont ofthe proceeds,

Which payment represents payment in full for Ms. Byrge's services- involving the children and the
parties which payment shffi be deemed in satisfaction ofher attorneys* lien previously filed.
8. . ' The remainiiig proceeds are to be deposited into- aninterestbearing trust account, set
up by counsel for both parties, with both signatures required for disbursements, which funds -are to
be distributed as the Cqurt orders'and as the parlies may agree. *
9-

Theclosing electric bill on the Ranchshouldbe paid, thereby allowing the buyers to

continue electrical: service. Counsel for the parties .are directed to* pay said bill after closing upon
presentation of satisfactory evidence of the amount due,
' 10.

Federatand state tax returns for the Double J Triangle LLC, which holdstitleonthe

real property, and the'pariies have been prepared by VanTiendren and Associates which company

E

o a ^ a - ^ i Bn J^S*S p i ? i .
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real property, and the parties .have Seen prepared by Van Tiendrfcn and Associates which company
is owed $2,000.00. Counsel for theparties'-are directed to pay the bill for those, services after closing
upon presentation of satisfactory evidence of-the amount due.
.11.

Each ofthe parties shall be paid $5000fromthe proceeds without prejudice to either

party's positibh'in this cas'e anil further amounts may be-available upon mutual agreement of the
parties. .Petitionees $5000 payment shall <b$ paid-to'the offices qf counsel-for Petitioner.
Respondent5 s $5000. payment shall be available directly to Respondent.
12. • The Court notes for the record that counsel for Petitioner has made every effort to
review this Order withP'etitioner^ but counsel has.been unable to reach Petitioner to receive her final
approval. Counsel for Petitioner believes-this Order'refiects substantially all matfersof an eadier
version ofthis Orderand on which Counsel received Petitioner's 'agreement. Counsel for Petitioner
believes this. Order reflects tins Court'sdedsion on the sale of the" subject property and protects
Petitioner's rights, but Counsel for Petitioner has'been unable to receive Petitioner's final approval
'regardingthis Order.
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AttonieyWr Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF'MAILING
- I hereby vceitiiy that I -mailed, .postage, prepaid, a 4we and correct, copy of the foregoing
''ORDER. ONRESSONDENT^S MOTION TO IIFT'LIS -PENDENS ON-PORTIONS OF
•PROPERTY AND APPROVE SALE CONDITIONS to the Mowing on this
ij

/ ^ d a y of

,200.;

Douglas L. Stowell
397 East Staaton-Avemte
Salt Lake City3Utah 84111

A:\Oidcc an l i s PaadcoS2;wpd

' •
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ADDENDUM 4
Complaint filed in 2004 by Plaintiff
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nje*S*y: F I L E D
Tonda Lynn Hampton
PlaintifftProse
Resident of Carbon County
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (435-637-0201)

^

APR232004
_

"SEVENTH DISTRICTCOURT/CARBON

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
COMPLAINT:
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON
Plaintiff,

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

vs
KIM C. JENSEN / RICHARD GOLDEN
Defendant

Case No. DY0 700^L5(^

FOR CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT;
1.1, Plaintiff, am a resident of Carbon County
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are property owners in Carbon County.
3. Defendant's true address is unknown.
4. Plaintiff/Beneficiary and Defendant have an "Interest Bearing Trust Account** together; that
require parties to agree and two signatures to release any monies.
(Trust created in approx. January 2002: "Golden Trust Account"; notation; Richard Golden is
one of the Defendants attorney's, both creators' of mentioned Trust. Quote defendants; "There
are no other agreements, oral or written, between either-of them" stated on Jan. 23rd, 2002 court •
order).
5.1, Plaintiff, on information and belief, allege that the Defendant is Breach of Fiduciary Duty.
6. The trust account no longer exists.
7. Defendant no longer obtains this attorney in question.

PTS-000973
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8.1 believe my Joint Partner/Defendant has now sold all of our other Carbon Coxmty Real estate,
as of approx. 2004; once deeded, in both of Plaintiff's and Defendants names approx. 3200 acres
that description listed in a Wild Life Division Easement Sale.
9. Record will show that, somehow, a Limited Liability Company sold our Real estate interest
10. Defendants True Records will show that Petitioner has never given any oral or written
document to allow any ownership change on approx. 4,000 acre. Which are at issue.
11. Petitioner isfilinga Complaint within Jurisdiction.
12. There are court ordersfromprevious cases# 994700340 and # 994700327 involving a
a. Protective Order and,
b. Civil Action: Common Law Marriage
c. Lis Pendensfiledon Nov. 15th, 1999 to Dec. 17*, 2002 in the case numbers mentioned.
13. Which Real estate mentioned; owned by the Petitioner and the Defendant Jointly and under
one or the other name is given Liz Pendens protection during the action; and,
14. Dec. 31st 2001 due to a decision; Court Bifurcate the property issues at that time.
13. As of Aag2d^ 2002, Trial; dismissed the Common Law Action.
14. Aug. Trial released a lis Pendens off of the mentioned Property as of Dec. 17th. 2002.
15- Dec. 18th, 2002, Defendant has an Easement SaleContract ($600,000.00)
16. Jan. 23rd, 2002 order is at issue.
(Jan.23rd, of 2002, court order: Refer to attached document).

I, Petitioner, move the court to make and enter an Order, on the defendant to hand over
all "True to Record" documentation involving the Real estate purchases between the Parties,
Transfers, Real estate sales agreements, and not limited to the Interest Bearing Trust Account
that I believe transferred with out my authorization.
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Petitioner seeks immediate attention in the above.
a. Defendant is avoiding all certified mailing to all nine adciresses known to Petitioner.
b. The Limited Liability Company addresses also avoid all certified mailing.
(True Record; Agent/Owner of the LLC Company is the Defendant as of approx. Aug.
2003).
c. As of this time, Defendant has not contacted Plaintiff at all by phone:
d. Defendant has phone number, given by Petitioner to his previous Paternity Attorney in
2003.
Plaintiff seeksfoilrecovery of all her losses, due to any unacceptable behavior.
All monies that are or been generatedfromthe Real estate ground to be reimbursed.
1. Cattle leases, owned by the Parties to this date,
2. CWMU Private Hunting Unit, voucher sales, and not limited to,
3. Water rights, which Plaintiff and Defendant owned as of 2004.
4. All land sales that went into the Interest Bearing Trust Account.

Certificate of Mailing
I hereby certify that on A^JLLI ^Z^j^booQ
, I mailed by certified
mailing a true and correct copy of the foregoing *COMPLAINT to the following:
Address:
Double J. Triangle, LLC
P.O. Box 415
Helper Utah, 84526
Address: PMB 169,2274 South, 1300 East,
STEG-15
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM 5
Motion to Dismiss, filed by Kim Jensen in the 2004 Suit, including as attachments:
(a) Order disposing of the 1999 Suit;
(b) Findings and Conclusions in the 1999 Suit;
(c) Complaint filed by Plaintiff in the 2002 Suit;
(d) Complaint filed by Plaintiff in the 2003 Suit;
(e) Order and Judgment disposing of the 2002 and 2003 Suits.
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RONALD H. GOODMAN - #3650
Attorney for Defendant
8 North Center Street, P. O. Box 727
American Fork, UT 84003-0727
Telephone: (801) 756-3576
Facsimile: (801) 756-3578
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TONDA LYNN HAMPTON,
MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff
vs.

Case No.. 040700256

KIM C. JENSEN,
Defendant.

Judge Bruce Halliday

COMES NOW the Defendant, Kim C. Jensen, by and through bis attorney, Ronald
H. Goodman, and moves for dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant. Defendant relies
upon the doctrine of Res Judicata as alleged in his Answer, and alleges that Plaintiffs claims have
already been adjudicated by mis Court. This Motion to Dismiss is supported by Defendant's
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismissfiledcontemporaneously with this Motion.
Dated this 7^_ day of A4pt{

. 2006.

RONALD H. GOODMAN^
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I herehy certify that I mailed a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing postage prepaid
in the U.S. Mail this.^2 day of frt-*^, 2006, to TondaLynn Hampton, Plaintiff, P. O. Box 586
Price, Utah 84501.
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MAY 3 0 2006
RONALD H. GOODMAN - #3650
Attorney for Defendant
8 North Center Street, P. O. Box 727
American Fork, UT 84003-0727
Telephone: (801) 756-3576
Facsimile: (801) 756-3578
IN THE

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS

SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

TONDA LYNN HAMPTON,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
vs.

KIM C. JENSEN,
Defendant

Case No.. 040700256
Judge Bruce Halliday

COMES NOW the Defendant, Kim C. Jensen, by and through his attorney, Ronald
H. Goodman, and submits the following Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss.
FACTS
1. Plaintiff s Complaint filed in this Court in Case No. 994700340 asking for a
determination of a common-law marriage and for a Decree of Divorce was dismissed on December
12,2006, because the Court found that there had been no common-law marriage between the parties.
Seethe Order and Findings and Conclusions attached as Exhibit I and incorporated herein by this
reference.
2. On December 13,2002, Plaintifffiledin this Court in Case No. 020701072 a
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Complaint against Defendant alleging a partnership existed between the parties, requesting the
dissolution of the partnership and splitting of all assets, real property and income. Specifically, the
Complaint listed assets ofcattle leases, CWMU Private Hunting Unit, water rights, and real property,
as well as "any and all Trust accounts since 1983." See the Complaint attached as Exhibit II and
incorporated herein by this reference*
3. On January 6, 2003, Plaintiff filed in this Court in Case No. 030700004 a
Complaint against Defendant alleging again p. partnership between the parties, and among other
things,fraudonDefendanf spart. Again, Plaintiff asked the Court to recover on personal assets and
real property, again listing cattle leases, CWMU Private Hunting Unit, water rights, and any and all
Trust accounts since 1983, See the Complaint attached as Exhibit III and incorporated herein by this
reference.
4 OnApril 25,2003,llieHonorableBryceK.BrynerenteredMs"RulingonMotion
to Dismiss Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion to
Release Lis Pendens" concerning both Casenos. 020701072 and 030700004. Judge Biyner's Ruling
in effect dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims for fraud, loss of business and partnership claims and
released the Lis Pendens filed against Defendant's real property.. See Judge Bryner's Ruling on
Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion
to Release Lis Pendens attached as Exhibit IV and incorporated herein by this reference.
5. In the Complaintfiledby Plaintiff in this case presently before the Court, Plaintiff

2

PTS-000797
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

73

nnnruR

o

has alleged breach offiduciaryduty regarding an alleged trust account created in January, 2002,
again naming Defendant as a Partner (paragraph 8), and claiming that Defendant sold Plaintiff and
Defendant's real estate without her permission. Again, in this Complaint, Plaintiff is asking for
recovery for cattle leases, CWMU Private Hunting Unit, water rights and real property sales.
6. Defendant hasfiledan Answer in this matter alleging the afiHrmative defense of
Res Judicata,
ARGUMENT
POINT I THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA ACTS AS A COMPLETE BAR TO
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS BECAUSE THEY HAVE ALREADY BEEN ADJUDICATED BY
THIS COURT.
Black's Law Dictionary, Centennial Edition (1891-1991), gives the following
definition of Res Judicata:
A matter adjudge; a thing acted upon or decided; a thing or matted
settled by judgment Rule that a finaljudgment rendered by a court
of competentjurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights
ofthe parties and their privies, and as to them, constitutes an absolute
bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause
of action. And to be applicable, requires identity in thing suedfor as
well as identity of cause of action, of persons andparties to action, and
ofquality in personsfor or against whom claim is made. The sum and
substance of the whole rule is that a matter once judicially decided is
finally decided
In the case before the Court, Defendant submits that Plaintiff s claims have already
been decided by this Court. Plaintiffs present Complaint is a poorly disguised attempt to bring
before the Court claims which this Court has already denied her. The Court's decisionfromthe
3
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common-law marriage claim (Case no. 994700340) denied Plaintiffs claims for amarriage and for
her interest in Defendant's real property. The trust account alleged by Plaintiffto have been created
in January, 2002, would have been at issue during the "common-law marriage" case because that
case was not decided until August 26,2002, and Findings, Conclusions and Order did not enter until
December 12,2002. Therefore, the Court's decisionkthatmatter acts as Res Judicata to Plaintiff
claims made in this case.
Undauntedbythe Court's decisioninCaseno. 994400340, Plaintiff stwo Complaints
filed within twenty (20) days of each olher (Case No. 020701072filedon December 17,2006, and
Case No. 030700004filedon January 6,2003) appear to have beenfiledby Plaintiff to try again to
take Defendant's assets and tie up the sale of his real property. Judge Bryner5 s decision effectively
squelched those meritless claims, and acts as Res Judicata to Plaintiffs claims in this case as well.
It is interesting to note that Plaintiff in each of her three (3)subsequent Complaints
to Case No. 994700340, has asked for recovery against Defendant's cattle leases, CWMU Private
Hunting Unit, water rights, and real property. Also, in each subsequent Complaint, trust accounts
have been alleged. This third Complaint should be dealt with by dismissal as well.
If the trust account alleged in this Complaint was actually created in January, 2002,
the issue should have been decided by the Court's December 17, 2002 decision in Case No.
994700340.
The Utah Court of Appeals decision in Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735

4
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P2cL 387 (UtahApp. 1987) is instructive regarding this case. It states the following at page 389:
The doctrine of resjudicata has two related but distinct branches.
Both branches, however, have the dual purpose of protecting
litigantsfromthe burden ofrelitigating an identical issue with the
same party or his privy and of promotingjudicial economy by preventing needless litigation. Penrodv. Nu Creation Creme, Inc. 669
P2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 1983); see gnerallly Blonder-Tongue Labor*
atories, Inc. v. University ofIllinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328329, 91 & CL 1434,1442-1443, 28 L EcL2d 788 (1971)
One branch, claim preclusion, bars the relitigation of a claim that
previously has been fully litigated between the same parties. To invoke this branch ofresjudicata, both suits must involve the same
parties or their privies and the same claim or cause ofaction.
Furthermore, thefirstclaim must have been litigated on the merits
and must have resulted in afinaljudgment Penrod, 669 P2d at 875.
In such a case, claim preclusion prevents relitigation not only of claims
actually litigated in (hefirstproceeding, but also claims which could
and should have been litigated in the prior action but were not raised.
(Emphasis added).
Plaintiffs trust account claim in this case could and should have been raised in Case
No, 994700327. That case was decided against Plaintiff, Plaintiff included in her Complaints in
Case Nos. 020701072 and 030700004 "any and all trust accounts since 1983," Those cases were
decided against Plaintiff
The matters before the Court in Plaintiffs Complaint herein have already been
judicially decided, and Plaintiff is not entitled to another "bite of the apple." The doctrine of Res
Judicata bars Plaintiffs claims.

5
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CONCLUSION
Base upon the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests that Plaintiffs Complaint
be dismissed
Dated this 2 ^ day of MQ^-,

2006.

RONALD H. GOODMAN
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing postage prepaid
in the U.S. Mail tins ffiday'of ^ - ? ^ 2 0 0 6 , to Tonda Lynn Hampton, Plaintiff, P. O. Box 586
Price, Utah 84501.
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EXHIBIT I
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Steven Kuhhhausen (1861)
Attorney for Respondent
10 West Broadway
Suite 603
'
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 322-1555

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS

TN1HESBVENTHDISTOICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TOND A LYNN HAMPTON JENSEN
Petitioner.
vs
KIM C. JENSEN

ORDER
Civil No. 994700340
Judge: Johaasen

Respondent
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law rendered in the above
captioned matter, the Court now makes and enters the following Order:
1.

Petitioner's Complaint be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice.

2.

The lis pendensfiledby the Petitioner in this action are .hereby ordered released and
discharged which are lodged against Respondents' real property in the Carbon County
State of Utah Recorders' Office as entry no. 77489 in book 445, entry no. 78686 in
book 449, entry no. 79477 in book 452 and any other lis pendens filed by Petitioner
against Respondent's real property.Pursuant to § 30-1-17.2, Petitioner is awarded $10,000.00 as and for attorney fees
upon the sale of Respondent's ranch or any portion thereof or release of thefimdsheld
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in trust by Respondent's former attorney Mclntyre and Golden.
DATED this^day of December, 2002
approved as to form

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the/f; day of December, 2002 a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing was mailed to:
/ Douglas Stowell
5 ^ * ^ 3 0 7 East Stanton Ave.
T* Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mclntyre & Golden
3838 South West Temple
|t Lake City, Utah 84115
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Steven Kuhnhausen (1861)
Attorney for Respondent
• 10 West BroadwaySuite 603
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801)322-1555
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SCVHNTH DISTRICT COURTS

m THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

TONDA LYNN HAMPTON JENSEN
Petitioner.

Civil No. 994700340 and 994700327

vs
KIM C.JENSEN

Judge: Johansen
Respondent.

This matter came on for trial on the 26* day of August, 2002. Both parties were in
attendance with their attorneys, Doug StowellforPetitioner, and Rick Goldea, for Respondent.
The attorneys requested an in-camera conference prior to the beginning of the trial during which
they both outlined their respective cases. When the trial began, the Court required the Petitioner
to proffer the nature and extent of her evidence on the crucial elements of UCA 30-1-4.5 pursuant
to the in-camera discussion. Respondent was allowed to likewise proffer his evidence on the
same. Both parties stipulated to admission of a taped conversation between the parties, exhibit
#1. Based upon priorfindingsand conclusions, the pleadings, the tape recording admitted into
evidence^ and the proffers of counsel as to the testimony of various witnesses as outlined below,
the Court now makes the followingfindingsand conclusions by a preponderance of the evidence.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties cohabited with each otherfrom1982 until 1996,
1
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The parties had two children in common, both born prior to November, 1996.
In November, 1996, the parties signed an agreement which terminated-the marital union, if
any existed, up to that time.
After November, 1996, the parties at times cohabited with each other, until November,
1999.
Certain witnesses would testify that the parties held a joint bank account sometime after
1996.
Certain witnesses would testify that the parties held a joint credit card after November,
1996.
Certain witnesses would testify that real property and waterrightswere jointly held by the
parties sometime after 1996,
The parties had consensual sexual relations with one another between November, 1996,
and November, 1999.
On three occasions between November, 1996, and November, 1999, Petitioner rebuffed
proposals by Respondent to many.
Petitioner's assertion that she rejected Respondent's marriage proposals because she
considered herself already marriedfliesin the face of the 1996 agreement, as well as
Petitioner's response to Respondents' summary judgment motion thai she was totally
ignorant of the law, and her prior position that she wasfrightenedof Respondent and
stayed with Mm only because she was afraid to leave.
At times between November, 1996, andNovember, 1999, the parties shared duties
commonly shared by husband and wife.
2
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12.

Certain witnesses would testify they believed the parties were husband and wife.

13.

Certain witnesses would testify that they did not believe that the parties were husband and
wife.

14.

Certain witnesses would testify that attimesthe parties held themselves out to be husband
and wife.

15.

Certain witnesses would testify that attimesthe parties specifically held themselves out to
be other than husband and wife.

16.

Certain witnesses would testify that the Petitioner specifically said that she was not
married to respondent.

17.

Certain witnesses would testify that Respondent always referred to Petitioner as a
girifiiend or fiance.

18.

Certain witnesses would testify that the Respondent on occasion referred to Petitioner as
his wife and to himself as Petitioner's husband.

19.

Some of the parties closest friends and family did not consider them to be married.

20.

The parties were not consistent in holding themselves out as married to the rest of the
world.

21.

Thomas E. Nelson, an estate planning attorney, would have testified that he prepared
estate planning documents on the basis of Respondent being unmarried ( date unclear).

22.

The partiesfiledseparate income tax returns prepared in 1998 and in prior years.

23.

Evidence of the parties' reputation of being married would be partial and conflicting.

24.

Petitioner may reapfinancialgain if a common law marriage is found to exist.

25.

Neither party is currently married to another.
3
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Both parties have obtained their majority.
• Petitioner has fled a lis pendensagainst Respondent's real property.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
UCA 30-1-4.5 is controlling law in this case.
The relevant time period during which the existence or lack thereof of a claimed common
law marriage between the parries is November, 1996, to November, 1999.
Consent to the existence of a marital contract is required under UCA 30-1-4.5.
Respondent proposed multiple times to Petitioner which Petitioner rejected each time.
A manifestation of intention not to accept an offer is a rejection of the offer.
There is no evidence of a particular point in time at which mutual consent to establish a
marital relationship between the parties existed.
While the parlies acquiesced in certain cohabitation arrangements between November,
1996, aad'Novembei; 1999, there is insufficient evidence of a deliberate intention that a
marriage would result
The parties did not consent to the existence of a martial contract,
By refusing Respondent's proposal to assume martial rights, duties,, and obligations,
Petitioner indicated her preference to " just live together" without mutual agreement to
form a marriage.
The parties are capable of giving consent to a marriage.
The parties are legally capable of entering into a solemnized marriage,,
The parties have at times mutually assumedrights,duties and obligations between
November, 1996 and November, 1999.
4
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The evidence of reputation as husband and wife is partial, divided, and not general or
uniform.

'

Evidence of each element of UCA 30-1-4.5 is essential to establish a valid marriage under
this statue which must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
Public policy weighs heavily in favor of narrow interpretation of common law marriage.
Properly solemnized marriage is an institution for the preservation of the human race and
happiness of all mankind. It is recognized as an honorable estate. Our nation and its
prosperity arefoundedupon homes of the people, and for this reason our legislature has
established laws for its protection and preservation.
A properly solemnized marriage is in the best interest of children.
The State has a compelling interest in encouraging properly solemnized marriages.
Care must be given to guard againstfraudulentmarriage claims especially where a
declaration of marriage would result infinancialrewards for the pumtive spouse.
When a reward is available, human nature may choose to strengthen and augment, in
retrospect, the consent to marry that was only tentative before the reward became
available.
The parties were not married during the period between November, 1996 and November
1999.
Petitioner has Med to meet her burden of proof as to an unsolemnized marriage.
In an action/to determine tie validity of a marriage the Court may make orders relative to

:

the parties properly and children pursuant to § 30-1-17,2 including attorney fees and
Petitioner's counsel hasfileda Renewed Motion for Attorney Fees.
5
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Because no* marriage exists their can be no- divorce decree as prayed for fa Count II of
Petitioner's Complaint.

DATED this /^day of December, 2002
approved as to

BY THE COURT
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CER1TFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ALday of December, 2002 a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing was mailed to:
I Douglas Stowell
fyz£uKtf/'$Q7 East Stanton Ave.
if
. Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mclntyre & Golden
3838 South West Temple
.. . Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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Tonda Lynn Hampton
Petitioner
Resident of Carbon County
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone: (435) 637-0201

;CTnrr

"IN THE SEVENTH-JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Tonda Lynn Hampton
• Petitioner,

Complaint

vs.

Civil No.:

K M C. JENSEN, OWNER OF
DOUBLE J. TRIANGLE, LLC.
Respondent

Judge: uW&nssts'

0ad)7O/#7<2

.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN That the above mentioned names have had. a Partnership,
involving Real Property, and that the Petitioner would like to dissolve all involve, and split all
* assets, Real Property, and incomefromany and all businesses.
1. Carbon County Real Property, in the name of DOUBLE J. TRIANGLE LLC, KimC. Jensen,
owner, also Property known as all of Spring Canyon Ranch, 6 miles west of Helper, Utah.
2. Summit County Real Property, lOacres approx. has been depleted and sold by the Respondent.
3. Assets,
a. 1999 Ford 350 Diesel Truck, DOUBLE L TRIANGLE LLC. Kim C. Jensen owner.
b. Other assets amounting to over 200,000.00 dollars, Respondent has been transferring and selling.
4. Business income,
a. Bed & Breakfast, known as Spring Canyon Ghost Town Guest Ranch, Inc. (Now, known as Double J.
Triangle. LLC. Owner Kim C. Jensen-. •
5. Business,
'
"
•
a. CWMU Private Hunting Unit Respondent has kept 100% of income at this time.
6. Cattle leases,
••
*
a. Respondent has kept all income at this time.
7. Water Rights,
a. Now transferred into the Double J. Triangle LLC, owner Kim C. Jensen.
8. Any and all Trust accounts since 1983
9. BYU Property, located in Spring Canyon
10. Edward Evatz Property, located in Spring Canyon
11. Kim Jensen Revokable Trust
,
12. AAA Enterprises, Triple A Entertainment, Cinderella's Escort Service, Glass Slipper
13. Kim C. Jensen Family Limited Partnership
14. Any and alll other hidden accounts, companies, Trust notes.
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Petitioner ask the Courts to bring this case forward and to resolve this dispute.
' During this case, a Lis Pendens need to be in place. To protect the Real Estate
involved. Respondent has been depleting, hiding, transferring,, out of Petitioners
name, Fraudulently.
(Evidence exist). .
-.
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Tonda Lynn Hamplon
Petitioner
Resident of Carbon County
Price, Utah 84501
Telephone. (435) 637-0201

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS

IN TIIM'SI-VI-NTM JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Tonda Lynn Hampton
Petitioner,

Complaint

vs.

Civil No.: a%Q

KIM C. JENSEN, OWNLR or
DOUBLE J, TRIANGLE, LLC.
Respondent

Judge :

746044*
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NOTICE IS 11KRKBY GIVEN that the above mentioned names have had a Partnership, .
involving Real Property, and personal assets, the Petitioner would also like to bring to attention
that the Respondent has been very abusive in this relationship;
Defamation, Slander, not limited to Physical Abuse and Emotional Maltreatment, has caused
Petitioner to lose her share in the business, due to Fraud, and her Reputation damaged, Petitioner
also seeks a Lis Pendens on the remaining Real Property until this matter is fully resolved.
Respondent has sold and hidden the Real Property at this time. Petitioner seeks full recovery on
the Personal assets, and on the Real Property.
At this time Lhe Petitioner ask the courts to reverse ownership to resolve, and sue for all
damages.
1. Carbon County Real Property, in the name of DOUBLE J. TRIANGLE LLC, Kim C Jensen,
owner, also Property known ES all of Spring Canyon Ranch, 6 miles west of Helper, Utah.
2. Summit County Real Property. lOacres approx. has been depleted and sold by the Respondent
3. Assets,
a. 1999 Ford liO Diesel Truck, DOUBLE J TRIANGLE LLC Kim C Jensen owner
b Other assets amounting 10 OYCT 200, 000 00 dollars, Respondent has been transferring and selling
4 Business income.
a. Bed &. Breakfast, known as Spring Canyon Ghosi Town Guest Ranch. Jnc (Now, known as Double I
Triangle LLC Owner Kim C Jensen.
5. Business,
a CWMU Private Hunting tJnii Respondent has kcpL 100% of income ai this lime
6 Cattle leases,
a. .Respondent has kept ail income at this lime.
7 Water Rights,

-A--
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a Now transferred into the Double J. Triangle LLC, owner Kim C. Jensen
.8. Any and all Trusi accounts since 1983
9 BYTJ Propeny, located in Spring Canyon
JO Edward Rvat? Property, locaicd in Spring Canyon
11 Kim Jensen Rcvokabie Trust
12 AAA F-werprises, Triple A Entertainment, Cinderella's Escon Service, Glass Slipper
13. Kim C Jensen Family Limned Partnership
14. Any and all orher hidden accounts, companies. Trust notes

Petitioner ask the Courts to bring this case forward and to resolve this dispute.

During this case, a Lis Pendens need to be in place. To protect the Real Estate
involved. Respondent has been depleting, hiding, transferring, out of Petitioners
name, Fraudulently and maliciously. .
(Evidence exist).
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FILED
APR 2 5 2003

IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS

TONDA LYNN HAMPTON, .

.

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS,
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS, MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION
TO RELEASE LIS PENDENS

Plaintiff
VS. •

. KTM C. JENSEN, owner of DOUBLE
J. TRIANGLE, LLC,
Defendant.

CaseNos. 020701072 and 030700004

)

)•

. Judge Bryce K. Bryner

On March 21, 2003, the defendant filed one motion entitled Motion to Dismiss, Motion to
•Dismiss Lis Pendens, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and Motion for Summary Judgment
and Damages for Wrongful Lien (hereinafter "the defendant's motion"), together with a
supporting memorandum. The plaintiff responded with ^Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Oppositi'on to which the defendantfileda Reply. A Notice to Submitfor Decision's filed on
April 24, 2003, and the motion is ripe for decision. The court has read and considered the
memorandum and now issues the following ruling:
The plaintiffs pro se complaintfiledon December 18, 2002, requests the dissolution of an
alleged partnership between the parties. The plaintiffs pro se complaint filed on January 6,
2003, appears torequest a dissolution of partnership and further asserts claims of defamation,
slander, physical and emotional abuse,fraud,and loss of business interests. The court notes,
however, that the plaintiff on page 15 of her Memorandum ofPoints and Authorities
subsequently withdrew her claim for physical abuse.
• The defendant's motion seeks a dismissal of the complaints on the grounds that; (1) certain
of the plaintiffs claims fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (2) other
claims in her complaint are time:barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. The defendantl

PTS-000820
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also seeks a release of the lis pendens filed by the plaintiff as well as summary judgment on the
issue of the partnership claims.
The plaintiffs complaint dated January 6, 2003, alleges the following causes of action:
1. Emotional Maltreatment

In paragraph 9 of plaintiff s affidavit dated April 1,2003,

attached to her memorandum, the plaintiff claims that oh March 2, 2002, the ''Defendant .violated
a protective-order and contacted me, verbally assaulting me."
Emotional, maltreatment is an intentional tort and is therefore subject to the one year statute
" of limitation stt forth in UCA 78-12-29. Although the complaint was filed within one year of the
alleged "verbal assault," the court finds that the action for assault fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. The court is persuaded that verbal abuse is not a cause of action, and
if the defendant is claiming emotional distress as a result of verbal abuse, the plaintiff has not
met the burden of pleading conduct considered outrageous or intolerable by societal standards.
2. Defamation and Slander: In paragraph 8 of the plaintiffs affidavit, the plaintiff claims
• that on August 26, 2002, (the day of trial) she first "became aware of false statements made to
various individuals by the defendant whichrelated to [her] character." She specifically avers-that
the defendant called her a "slut" and a "filthy pig," and that such statements were made to Sharon
" Jensen, Delvin McFarland, and Randy Finkbinder.
Defamation and slander are intentional torts and are subject to the one year statute of
limitations set forth in UCA 78-12-29 (4).§ .However, the one year period of limitations does not
begin to run until the slander or defamation is known or is reasonably discoverable by a plaintiff.
' Allen v. Ortiz. 802 P.2d 1307 (TJtah 1990). The complaint was filed on January 6, 2003.
Because the plaintiffs complaint for defamation and slander were filed within one year after the
statements were discovered, the action is not time-barred by the one year statute of limitation
. 3. Fraud: Rule 9 (b)" of the UtahRules of-Civil Procedure requires that the circumstances
surrounding ffaud be plead with particularity. The court has examined the complaint and finds

PTS-000821
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that the alleged fraud has not been pled with particularity. The complaint merely states that the
' plaintiff lost her share in the business ""due to -fraud."
Additionally, the date of the alleged fraud is not stated in the complaint.nor'is it stated
when the alleged fraud was discovered:by the-plaintiff. An action for fraud must be filed within
3 years of the fraud or the discovery thereof. UCA 78-12-26 (3). It cannot be determined from
the face of the complaint when, the cause of action arose in order to be able to establish when the
statute of limitatiohs began to run.
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted and the said cause of action is ordered dismissed.
4. Loss of Business: The plaintiff's complaint asserts a claim for'"loss of business," and the
complaint does not assert that the claim is..based upon a written agreement. Accordingly, the 4
year statute of limitation set forth in UCA 78-12-25(1) is applicable. The complaint does not
identify the business that allegedly suffered the loss nor does it state the date upon which the
cause of action arose or the damages suffered. The cause of action for "loss of business"
therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
5. Partnership: Both complaints allege a partnership "and in essence request the court to
dissolve the partnership. A partnership based on an oral agreement is.subject to. the 4 year statute
of limitation set forth in UCA. There is a disagreement in the affidavits, however, as to when the
partnership ended and when the statute of limitations began to run. The plaintiff asserts that the
partnership terminated when the plaintiff vacated the premises on November 1, 1999, and that
the claim for partnership was timely in each case within the 4 year limitation period. The court
ctonot determine when the defendant claims the partnership terminated, except that he claims it
terminated more than 4 years priorto the filing of the complaint on December 13, 2002. Thus
there is a material and mixed issue of fact and law with regard to the defense of statute of
limitations, i.e., when the partnership terminated and when the statute of limitations began to run.

PTS-000822
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Nevertheless, the courtfindsthat under Rule 13 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the claim
for partnership and dissolution of partnership should have been brought as a compulsory
counterclaim when the plaintifffiledher answer and 'amended answer to the defendant's
counterclaim in the common law divorce case in the Seventh District Court in Carbon County.
The failure to do so is fatal to the plaintiffs causes of action for partnership and dissolution of
partnership. The claims for partnership and dissolution are therefore ordered dismissed and the
lis pendensfiledin the Carbon County Recorder's office as.a result of the claims asserted in each
of the above two cases are ordered released.
•DATED this 25th day of April, 2003.

• .'
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ADDENDUM 6
Order Disposing of the 2004 Suit
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THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL CpURT IN AND FOR C:
STATE OF UTAH

TONDA LYNN HAMPTON,
Plaintiff,
vs

ORDER
' Case No. 040700256

KIM C JENSEN,
Defendants,

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendant Kim C. Jensen' (*Jensen'') has filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the claims made by plaintiff Tonda
'Lynn Hampton (''Hampton") are precluded by the decisions made in
case numbers 994700340, 994700327, 020701072, and 030700004, all
filed in Carbon County,

Hampton opposes dismissal.

The court has read Hampton's complaint filed on April 23,
2 004.

Rule 8, U.R.C.P., requires that a complaint contain a

"short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader
*is entitled to relief" and "a demand for judgment for the relief"
desired.

Hampton's complaint does not satisfy this standard..

While there are portions of the complaint that are
understandable, most of the numbered paragraphs do not
communicate any meaning to the court. Taken as a whole, the

1
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complaint does not explain what has happened, and why what has
happened entitles Hampton to relief from this court. Moreover,
given that this court has seen four previous lawsuits between
these parties in the past seven years, it does not appear likely
that Hampton can prepare and file an amended pleading compliant
with Rule 8.

The complaint is accordingly dismissed with

prejudice.
Jensen asserts that the doctrine of res judicata bars this
action.

Since that argument raises matters outside the

pleadings, namely the substance of the other disputes resolved
earlier, this must be treated as motion for summary judgment.
The court takes judicial notice of the filings in those other
cases which have been attached to pleadings filed in this case.
From those pleadings, the court is satisfied that, to the extent
Hampton may have succeeded in stating a claim that satisfies the
requirements of Rule 8, U.R.C.P., that claim either was, or'
should have been, raised in at least one of'those earlier cases.
Jensen is accordingly also entitled to summary judgment and
Hampton's complaint is hereby dismissed on that ground as well.

2
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This order is the final order of this court in this case.
No further order or judgment is required.

Dated t h i s

M

day of September, 2006

PTS-000671
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I c e r t i f y t h a t a copy of t h e a t t a c h e d document was s e n t t o t h e
f o l l o w i n g p e o p l e f o r c a s e 040700256 b y t h e method a n d on t h e d a t e
specified.
METHOD NAME

Mail

Mail

Dated this

TONDA LYNN HAMPTON
PLAINTIFF
PO BOX 586
PRICE, UT 84501
RONALD H GOODMAN
ATTORNEY DEF
8 N CENTER ST
POB 727
AMERICAN FORK UT 84003-0727
20

7)0.

Page 1 (last)
PTS-000672
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ADDENDUM 7
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
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JUL 20

TONDA LYNN HAMPTON
P.O.BOX 586
Price Utah 84501
Tele: (435) 650-3333

(ISffiilCM

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TONDA LYNN HAMPTON
Plaintiff,

I:
I[
;
{

PLAINTIFF MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

({ Case No.: 070700813

Vs.
PROFESSIONAL TITLE SERVICES,
a corporation
Defendant;
CLAY G. HOLBROOK an individual
Defendant

' Judge: Douglas B. Thomas
1
(
<
(

Plaintiff, Tonda Lynn Hampton as Pro Se, in accordance with Rule 7 (c)(1)
U.R.C.P., herby submit her Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment, and assert she is entitled to have Defendants' Motion Denied on the
grounds of Concealment and Material Fact and there is genuine issues for Trial as will be
stated below:
Plaintiffs Response to Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff makes a general objection to all defendants' statement numbered 1 through 6.
1. Plaintiffs Complaint is barred by the running of the respective statutes of
limitations;
Response: Denies,
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a. An Oral Agreement in effect approximately the year of 2007 and for that reason
Plaintiff filed in a timely manner (within one year).
b. Fraud filed within 3 years UCA 78-12-26 (3).
c. Defendants Files, produced in 2008, have now exposed the concealed
documents and due to the intentional Fraudulent Concealment and the
avoidance by the defendants to produce to Plaintiffs earlier request Toll the
Statute of Limitations.
2. Plaintiffs Complaint is barred by the issue preclusion branch of the doctrine of
res judicata;
Response: Denies,
a. This case is based on Oral Agreements the Defendants' entered into on
approximately the year of 2007.
b. During this case the Third Amended Complaint mentions Fraud now
discovered within the Defendants files produced during Rule 26 Discovery
stage which documents have previously been concealed.
3. Defendants complied with their duties as closing and escrow agents, and the facts
demonstrate that they cannot be liable for breach of contract, negligence, slander
of title, or fraud;
Response: Denies,
Defendants did not do their full duty of care before the escrow order where into
effect. Defendants have interfered with Plaintiffs titled ownership prior to the to the
Stipulation Order dated January 23, 2002 and Escrow order dated approximately
January 25, 2002 and continued to conceal other documents until 2008 Discovery
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stage and therefore are responsible and liable. Defendants caused error in the "Chain
of title" which Holbrook admitted before July 2007 and did agree to compensate for
her losses, before the date of the filed Complaint dated August 14, 2007. Plaintiff
claims Doctrine of Fraudulent Concealment has been carried out by the Defendants
and will demonstrate in her Opposition to the Summary Judgment with her Affidavit
attached to her once deed real estate.
4. There was no meeting of the minds regarding any alleged settlement agreement;
Response: Deny
There was a final Agreement and not negotiation Defendant Holbrook realized
plaintiffs position and his. He contacted her with a figure to relinquish her rights for
$21,185.47 to a certain Deed of Title (6.32 acres Home) and then asked if she would
draw up that agreement however he did not like the wording to her agreement; it put
all the blame on. (see Affidavit of Tonda Hampton Exhibit 8, PTS000662). Defendant
then stated he would have an agreement drawn up the next day approximately 20 days
later on August 27, 2002 he provides Agreement, Deed and Disclaimer for
$21,185.47 for the 6.32 acres as agreed to. But the Agreement was not sign due to
the Defendant finding a filed complaint dated August 14, 2007 which he added for
Plaintiff to dismiss complaint within his Settlement Agreement.
5. Because Plaintiffs Complaint was brought in bad faith, Defendants are entitled to
their attorney's fees for defending this action.
Response: Deny
Plaintiff filed the complaint long after their agreements to compensate her for her
losses. Defendant did not agree to the wording of Plaintiffs agreement, Holbrook
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stated that he would draw up the agreement and have to her approximately August 9,
2007. However Plaintiff never heard from Holbrook. Plaintiff called numerous times
only to be told Holbrook is out of the office or out of town. Complaint filed August
14, 2007 in order to protect her rights against the Statute of Limitations.
6. A Memorandum in support is filed contemporaneously herewith. WHEREFORE,
Defendants Professional Title Services and Clay Holbrook request that summary
judgment be granted in their favor and against Plaintiff on all causes of action
raised in Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint, and that Defendants be awarded
their attorney's fees due to Plaintiffs bad faith in bringing this action.
Response: Deny
Defendants Memorandum for Summary Judgment should not be granted on the
grounds that there is Material Fact and Defendants' Motion Denied on the grounds of
Concealment and there are genuine issues for Trial. Defendant should not be awarded
attorney fees on the grounds that her complaint is bought in good faith.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1. Plaintiff did own title to these Deeds; listed below;
a. Warrant Deed August 27,1993; water rights numbers are listed on deed,
grazing permits, grazing leases See Affidavit of Tonda Hampton at # 35
(PTS000428 to PTS000431);
L Application for Grazing Permit No. GP 21094
b. Quit Claim Deed August 27, 93 (PTS000432);
c. Special Warranty Deed May 3, 1994 (PTS000433 and PTS000434);
d. Quit Claim Deed May 3, 1994 (PTS000435);
e. Quit Claim Deed May 3,1994 (PTS000436);
f. Warranty Deed August 1997 (PTS000437);
2. Defendants did alter her ownership;
a. Quit Claim Deed dated April 20,1997 and recorded on November 15,
1999 request of Professional Title Service (see Affidavit of Tonda
Hampton, Exhibit #19).
b. Planning & Zoning document dated January 1998 and the legal
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description that Defendants failed to recorded a title to document as
stated in that document which is the cause for a deed to be floating out
there somewhere, (see Affidavit of Tonda Hampton, Exhibit #15).
3. Due to the fact of Defendants Negligence in their Duty is the cause of that Quit
Claim Deed dated April 20, 1997 to later appear over two years and seven months (2
years and 7months) later. The Failure of Defendants to record that title allowed that
same title and additional several legal descriptions were attached of approximately
4100 acres and included that May 6, 1998 title consisting of 6.32 acres and House.
PTS recorded on November 15, 1999.
4. Therefore defendants are liable for breach of contract, negligence, slander of title,
and for the fraud discovered within defendants "Defendants provided 427 documents
(July 9, 2008) (see Affidavit of Tonda Hampton, Exhibit #26).
5. There exist an Oral Agreement due to the meeting of the minds. (See Affidavit of
Tonda Hampton all documents).

CONCLUSION
For the reason and upon the grounds set forth in the foregoing memorandum,
Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to deny Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. Defendant has violated Plaintiffs rights of her Titled ownership to
thousands of acres when they cause the Error in the Chain of Title by their
Negligence and other stated in the Third Amended Complaint.
This is not a case for Summary Judgment because of the facts;

this court is asked to recognize this case for what it is — a case in which defendant
Holbrook has agreed to an oral agreement thus, the documents provided during discover
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has exposed the defendants' to mistakes and fraud of the plaintiffs real estate in
question. Defendant's had no legitimate right to alter ownership of plaintiff s titles
ownership and then continue to conceal when plaintiflFin 2006 requested certain
documents. (See Affidavit of Tonda Hampton).

DATED this o2#day of July, 2009.
£Tonda Lynn Hampto
Hampton
Plaintiff
ProSe
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this Q(j day of July, 2009,1 caused to be mailed a true and
correct copy of the going pleading, postage prepaid, to the following:
Hirschi Christensen, PLLC
Justin R.Bair (11035)
136 East South Temple, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

ynn Hampton
Plaintiff
ProSe
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ADDENDUM 8
Affidavit of Tonda Hampton in Support of
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
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JUL 2 0 2009

TONDA LYNN HAMPTON
P.O.BOX586
Price Utah 84501
Tele: (435) 650-3333

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TONDA LYNN HAMPTON,
Plaintiff,

([ AFFIDAVIT OF T02SDA LYNN
i{ HAMPTON
1{

VS.

Case No.: 070700813

( Judge: Douglas B. Thomas

PROFESSIONAL TITLE SERVICES,
a corporation
Defendant;
CLAY G. HOLBROOK an individual
Defendant

(
(
(

I, Tonda Lynn Hampton, being firs duly sworn, depose and state as follows:

1.

I am over the age of 21 years, and am competent to testify in this matter.

2.

I am a named Plaintiff in this matter.

3.

I filed a Complaint dated August 14,2007 against the Defendants in this case.
a. Clay G. Holbrook, served on December 2007 and;
b. Professional Title Services on December 2007.

4.

On August 14, 2006,1 sent a letter to Mr. Clay G. Holbrook by certified mail

Questioning Deed of Ownership (6.32 acres and House) Certified Letter is attached to my
affidavit as Exhibit 1 (stamped PTS000645).
5.

Due to no response, On September 15,2007,1 sent a letter to Mr. Clay G.

Holbrook by certified mail Questioning Deed of Ownership (6.32 acres and House)

000384
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Certified Letter is attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 2 (stamped PTS000646 to
PTS000648).
6.

On September 27, 2007, (Holbrook did call Hampton September 25, 2007 as

stated in this letter) I sent a letter to Mr. Clay G. Holbrook by certified mail again
Questioning Deed of Ownership (6.32 acres and House) Certified Letter is attached to my
affidavit as Exhibit 3 (PTS000649 to PTS000651).
7.

Due to no response, On October 12, 2006,1 sent a letter to Mr. Clay G. Holbrook

by certified mail Questioning Deed of Ownership (6.32 acres and House) Certified Letter
is attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 4 (PTS000652 to PTS000654).
8.

October 16, 2006, Holbrook contacted Hampton stating "Said lands were sold

according to the terms of an order of the court entered January 23, 2002. Letter is
attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 5 (PTS000655).
9.

On November 25, 2006,1 sent a letter to Mr. Clay G. Holbrook by certified mail

Questioning Deed of Ownership (6.32 acres and House) and stated that I appreciate his
information stated above in no. 8. Certified Letter is attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 6
(PTS000656).
10.

On July 23, 2007,1 sent a letter to Holbrook, that I appreciate his concerns about

the Real estate in question. Holbrook had earlier stopped Hampton in the Court house
and stated that there is an error in title letter is attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 7
(PTS000657).
11.

Holbrook arranged a meeting with me at the office of Professional Title Services

to discuss the title and a compensation to relinquish my rights to that title of 6.32 acres.

000385
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We both agreed to half of $42,060.94 remainder of that what Escrow order of

$200,000.00. (see affidavit of Clay G. Holbrook exhibit 1 (PTS305 and PTS304).
13.

Holbrook requested that I draw up the Agreement, I did and delivered it to the

Office of Professional Title Services the Agreement is attached to my affidavit as Exhibit
8 (PTS000662 to PTS000666).
14.

I called several different days to the office to contact Holbrook, but he was gone

out of the office or out of town.
15.

I made contact to Holbrook by phone, He stated that he did not like my wording

that it put all the blame on him.
16.

I told him I was sorry, and stated that he would be more experienced to draw up

an Agreement.
17.

Holbrook said he would get back to me approximately on August 9, 2007.

18.

I did not hear from Holbrook, I called he was either gone or out of town.

19.

I filed an August 14, 2007 complaint in order to protect my rights. But did not

serve Defendants' in case they kept their Agreement.
20.

I finally reach Holbrook by phone approximately August 27, 2007; He made a

comment to the effect "That It seems that you have taken different measures" and then he
mentioned the Complaint that I filed on August 14, 2007.
21.

I told him that the time is of the essence and I had to protect my rights.

22.

Holbrook arranged for me, to come to the office at Professional Title Service to

settle up. Concerning the 6.32 acre and House and a check for the amount of $21,185.47.

000386
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I arrived at the office, Holbrook proceeded to give me documents to sign which

consisted of a Settlement Agreement, Disclaimer and Quit Claim Deed attached to my
affidavit as Exhibit 9 (PTS000658 to PTS000661).
24.

I had notice that Settlement Agreement, and the terms stating "First Party

(Hampton) will dismiss, or cause to be dismissed, that certain action filed August 14,
2007" attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 9 (PTS000658).
25.

I did not sign documents due to the fact of that Settlement Agreement.

26.

Holbrook said he is responsible for the 6.32 acres only and not the rest and

insisted that I need to reword my complaint and then we will see what can be done
(regarding that $21,185.47).
27.

Plaintiff did not feel comfortable with Holbrook request and on December 10,

2007 served each defendant with the August 14, 2007 complaint and Summons.
28.

During the discovery stage, in 2008 defendants produced hundreds of document

which alerted me to the ownership, the altered documents and certain Deeds filed (and
not filed) I am trying to make some sense of all this.
29.

At this time Plaintiff believes that Defendants are Liable for her losses of several

thousands of acres due to admitting error and know through this case defendants continue
to conceal there actions by filing a Summary Judgment.
30.

Because Defendants altered and concealed true ownership to all of my real estate

I did not receive my portion of the individual sells, (see Affidavit of Clay G. Holbrook,
Exhibit 1 and 2 within Memorandum in support of Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment).

00038?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

117

o
31.

o

Because Defendants fraudulently concealed a document called a TRUST DEED

NOTE for $85,000.00,1 did not receive my portion is attached to my affidavit as Exhibit
10(PTS7).
32.

Because Defendant Altered ownership of my titles and fraudulently concealed the

misconduct, I did not receive my portion of the individual sell of $ 600,000.00 attached to
my affidavit as Exhibit 11 (PTS100 and PTS101).
33.

Because Defendant Altered ownership of my titles and fraudulently concealed I

did not receive my portion of the individual sell of $ 300,000.00 attached to my affidavit:
as Exhibit 12 (Missing at this time).
34.

Because Defendant Altered ownership of my titles and continued to fraudulently

concealed the truth, I did not receive my portion of the individual sell of $ 125,000.00
attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 13.
35.

Defendants and I have had several transactions since 1993 that involve several

parcels of land, water rights, and grazing permits that are deeded to Jensen and Hampton,
as joint tenant. Deeds are attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 14.
a. Warrant Deed August 27,1993; water rights numbers are listed on deed,
grazing permits, grazing leases (PTS000428 to PTS000431);
i. Application for Grazing Permit No. GP 21094
b. Quit Claim Deed August 27, 93 (PTS000432);
c. Special Warranty Deed May 3, 1994 (PTS000433 and PTS000434);
d. Quit Claim Deed May 3, 1994 (PTS000435);
e. Quit Claim Deed May 3, 1994 (PTS000436);
f Warranty Deed August 1997 (PTS000437);
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36.

In 1997, Planning and Zoning are subdividing out of my Titled to Section 7 that

has 549.79 acres; which then the 6.32 acres was separated leaving 543.47 acres in section
7 attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 15 (PTS405 to PTS407). Defendants recorded this
Certificate of Waiver that is dated January 7, 1998 with the description attached 6.32
acres and recorded on May 7, 1998. However "This Certificate must be recorded with the
deed... ."(see at PTS406) there is NO DEED RECORDED which is the cause of a title
floating around somewhere unknown to me at the time.
37.

Defendants are aware of several loans on the real estate from 1993 to

approximately 2002; the last pay off attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 16.
a. August 8, 1997; Jensen and Hampton on 6.32 acres;
b. August 27, 1997; Jensen and Hampton on Section-7; 549.79 acres;
c. August 27,1997; Jensen and Hampton on 6.32 acres;
d. February 26, 1998: Jensen and Hampton on 6.32 acres;
38.

May 6,1998 Quit Claim Deed to Jensen and Hampton is recorded by Professional

Title Services on May 7, 1998 with the description of 6.32 acres attached to my affidavit
as Exhibit 17 (PTS000442 to PTS000443).

39.

Defendants aware of these title reports attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 18.
a. June 10, 1998; Jensen and Hampton on 6.32 acres (PTS351 to PTS354);
b. June 10, 1998; Jensen and Hampton on approximately 4,100 acres
(PTS149tol55);

This document appears to be altered; Jensen and Hampton interest is replaced with a hand
written "Double J-see other file", (see at document stamped PTS149) and it appears that
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632 acres is also listed on this same report with a hand written note stating "Change to
Foy's legal" (see at document stamped PTS151) and the Green Belt has a note "Replace
w/ Bk 449 p 534 (see at document stamped PTS155 at #31).
40.

April 20, 1997 Quit Claim deed recorded November 15,1999 by Professional

Title Serviced (2 years 7 months later) attached is an Exhibit A, which is approximately
4,100 acres with that 6.32 acres and house Tax ID 2A-1036-L (Jensen and Hampton to
K.C. Family Limited Partnership) attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 19 (PTS000444 to
PTS000446) and approximately two minutes later;
41.

April 20,1997 Quit Claim deed recorded November 15,1999 by Professional

Title Serviced also attached is a Exhibit A, which is approximately 4,100 acres with that
6.32 acres Tax ID 2A-1036-1. (K.C. Family Limited Partnership to Double J Triangle,
L.L.C) attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 20 (PTS000447 to PTS000449).
42.

Approximately 2008, Plaintiff was given a copy of a document dated February 1,

2000 that was buried in an old filing cabinet that had revealed this letter that states "I
talked with Clay (Holbrook) and he said that it was included with the other parcel that
were already changed to double I Triangle

Now the application that is on the home

and the 6.32 acres will have the name Double J Triangle" Signed Francis Price; Carbon
County Assessor office attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 21 (TLH1).
43.

A document by Holbrook dated On September 11,2002, states "I, Clay G.

Holbrook, certify that I am licensed as Title Insurance Agent

that I have reviewed

the attached document and have prepared this Report of Water Right Conveyance or that
it was done under my direct supervision

I further certify that the documents attached

hereto evidence the ownership interest of the current water right owner(s) named in

Gocmo
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section A; (See PTS311) Section A gives a description of that April 20,1997 Quit Claim
Deed that was recorded on November 15, 1999 by Professional Title Services (See
PTS310) attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 22.
44.

I also will admit that during all of these transactions especially beginning 1996 to

the now that I was a battered woman and filed for a Protective Order and a Divorce
against Jensen I was in Therapy for several years. However the Court found no marriage
existed and therefore no divorce degree can be granted. The parties have two children
together at that time were 14 year old and a l l year old. Court did not enter an Order for
Child Support.
45.

On September 27, 2002, a Review and Order in Case No.: 131094; 154297;

attached to my affidavit as Exhibit 23 (TLH48-1 to TLH49-1).

46.

History of Hampton cases listed below 6 total.

1. 994700327 (Abuse case) Filed approximately November 1,1999 with
Protective Orders in place (Hampton evaluated with (PTSD) post traumatic
stress syndrome) and as of;
a. 2002 September 27, Review and Order (TLH48-1)
i. "Mr. Stubbs reports that mother (Hampton) is making progress
and the children have improved in school"

"Mr. Stubbs

is recommending continued PSS with the mother"... ."Dr. Elder
recommends that the boys get to choose how and when they
visit with father";
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(

ii.

)

"Mr. Golden (defendant attorney) report that the father
(Jensen) would like visitation or custody. He would like
Mother to get more help and have DCFS supervise more
closely"... ."Mother wants protective supervision with DCFS
continued" (see at middle of page 1).

iii. ORDER "Protective supervision with custody to the mother is
continued";
iv. "There will be no visits with father except as requested by the
boys and therapist";
v. "The boys are to continue therapy with 4CMH

";

vi. "There is to be no exchange of the physiological evaluations"
(seeatpg.2(TLH49-l).

2. 994700340 (Divorce petition (18 years) Lis Pendens filed November 15, 1999
Hampton and Jensen, joint tenant on the real estate titles (see def. Mem. Sum.
Jud. Exh. C). both cases dismissed; Final Court Order dated December 17,
2002.
i. Because no marriage exists their can be no divorce decree as
prayed for."(see def. Mem. Sum. Jud. Exhibit 1, pg. 6, line 23).

3. 020701072 (Partnership Dissolution) filed December 18, 2002; Hampton vs.
Jensen plaintiff also list her titled property as ccProperty known as all of
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Spring Canyon Ranch, 6 miles west of Helper, Utah, (see Defendants Mem.
Sum. Jud. exhibit H (PTS000813), at #1 on doc. PTS-000814).

4. 030700004 (Partnership Dissolution, Slander, Physical and emotional abuse,
fraud, and loss of business interest) filed January 6, 2003, Hampton vs. Jensen
and filed lis pendens. Case dismissed April 25, 2003 "Nevertheless, the Court
finds under Rule 13(a) URCP, the claim for partnership and dissolution of
partnership should have been raised in 1999 Common Law Marriage case (see
Def Mem. Sum. Jud. Exhibit IV, document stamped PTS000823).

5. 034700021 (Paternity Case) Hampton vs. Jensen; Contempt Mr. Jensen in the
rear on child support and Hampton seeking an order for Child support since
there was no order issued after the 1999 divorce petition.

6. 040700256 (Fiduciary Duty) Hampton vs. Jensen Filed April 23, 2004 (see
Def. Mem. Sum. Jud. Exhibit M (PTS000973) also state that "The trust
account no longer exists (see at #5 (PTS000973), Dismissed September 13,
2006; due to "Rule 8, U.R.C.P., requires that a complaint contain a "short and
plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and
"a demand for judgment for the relief' desired. Complaint does not satisfy this
standard" (See Def Mem. Sum. Jud. exhibit O, at pg. 1 par.2).
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o
47.

o

However 2002, January 23, exist a "Stipulation Order" Plaintiff opposes this

stipulation order on the grounds that it isfraudulentin its real estate claims and water.
a. In the 1999 case defendant Ex Parte Motion that lead to telephonic
hearing on that Motion. (See Def Mem. Sum. Jud; exhibit G; pg. 1; stamped
PTS000481)
b. "Counsel for both parties, by approving this Order, represent to the
Court that they do not specialize in real property transactions and that neither counsel
makes any representations to the Court, any party or any other person regarding the
property description in this Order: Rather the property descriptions herein are based
solely on descriptions provided by the real estate brokers or title insurance companies,
copies of which have been provided to the Court" (see pg. 2 and 3; stamped PTS000482
&PTS000483at#5.
c. "The Court notes for the record that counsel for Petitioner (Hampton)
has made every effort to review this Order with Petitioner, but counsel has been unable to
reach Petitioner to receive her final approval. Counsel for petitioner believes this Order
reflects substantially all matters of an earlier version of this Order and on which Counsel
received Petitioner's agreement see at (PTS000486) at #12.
d. Two Parcel are ordered to be release from a Lis Pendens;
(1) Ghost Town Guest Ranch Lodge and the 6.37 acres on which it is located:
Tax K)#2A-1036-002, Carbon County, state of Utah,
and.
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o

(2) Approximately 675 Acres west of Helper, Utah: All of Carbon County tax
ID#2A-1060-0002, containing 428.96 acres more or less. All of the property owned by
Double J Triangle LLC which is in Carbon County Tax ID#2A-103 8-0000 and
containing approximately 246 acres. These two parcels contain approximately 675
acres more or less" (see Def Mem. Sum. Jud. Pg. 3, stamped PTS000483 at #1).
e. However within the Stipulation Order referring to Tax ID#2A-103 80000 "All of the property owned by Double J Triangle LLC which is in Carbon County
Tax ED#2A-103 8-0000 and

containing approximately 246 acres. These two parcels

contain approximately 675 acres more or less" (see Def Mem. Sum. Jud. Pg. 3, stamped
PTS000483at#(2).

It appears on record that the Tax ID#2A-1038-0000 never did belong to Double J
Triangle LLC that contains 246 acres.
The Tax ID#2A-1038-0000 is owned by Carbon County acreage of 0.08 acres attached to
my affidavit as Exhibit 24 (TLH33-1).

f. "In addition, two acre feet of water provided from other property owned
by Double J Triangle is to be included in the sale (see Def. Mem. Sum. Jud. pg. 4, at last
two line on page (PTS000484). However they never did own the water (see attachment
22, especially (PTS422 and PTS96) it appears there was pressure to get that water to the
new owners of that court order sell of that 6.32 acres).
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o
In addition, Plaintiff is ignorant to how real estate
descriptions operate but familiar of the loan that is in
Default for foreclosure and ordered to sell. Holbrook being
familiar with the real estate would have noticed the above
mentioned or at some point during title insurance, or title
research but instead continued to fraudulently conceal.

48.

Plaintiff has transcript word for word of a recording. The recording is of August

27, 2007 meeting at Professional Title Services with Holbrook and is attached to my
affidavit as Exhibit 25 (TLH4-1 to TLH15-1).

49.

It appears within Defendants files stamped PTS-1 through PTS-668 there are

certain altered documents discovered during the Discovery stage Under Rule 26, as of
2008 plaintiff has tried to review and understand what has happened that wipe her out
and what is the cause that removed all Hampton, Joint Tenant ownership of several titles
and all Water Rights and tangibles.

I have listed a portion in all of the above statements and therefore I Deny allegations
made by the Defendants Memorandum and Affidavit.
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50.

o

Defendants Memorandum states "Court had already determined that Plaintiff

(Hampton) did not have right or title to those properties. Accordingly, Plaintiffs case is
are barred by the doctrine of res Judicata. (See at Defendants Mem. In Supp. Sum. Jud. at
pg. 2, at IV. Paragraph 1, line 4). Plaintiff deny this statement.

51.

Defendants Attorney requested documents from those cases one (1) through five

(5), listed above, at # 46, plaintiff response "Object to the request on the ground that the
above request does not pertain to this suit" (Def. exh. B, Mem. in Supp. Sum. Jud.).
52.

Defendants never requested the Case No. 040700256 Which now is stated in that

Motion "However, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit in 2004, Fiduciary Duty on Jensen
which was also dismissed by this Court" (see at pg. ii, par. 2, last 2 lines on pg).
Plaintiffs states this case is the reason for her to contact Defendants to obtain
information within a file that Defendants controlled.
53.

I sent First Certified letter on August 14, 2006, to the place of business

Professional Title Services, located in Price Utah approximately one month before this
case no. 040700256 was dismissed, then I followed with several more certified letters to
Defendants to obtain the chain of title.
53.

This Case No. 040700256 was dismissed September 12, 2006.1 was going to

Appeal but time is now against me. Defendant finally contacted me by phone, September
25, 2006 after the dismissal. See Plaint. Affid. Exh. 3.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,14

000337

54.

I sent again another certified letter dated. Defendant Clay G. Holbrook

approached me while I was in the Court House in Price, Utah and wanted to meet with
me. He stated that there had been an error made.
55.

I sent a Letter thanking him for his concern and I cannot meet him on that date we

discuss earlier.
56.

Meeting of July 2006, the Parties agreed she is Joint tenant on the titles. Clay G.

Holbrook presented an Escrow document ($200,000.00 House and 6.32 acres) to Plaintiff
at the offices Professional Title Services. Clay G. Holbrook and Plaintiff agreed to
compensate her half that she would have been entitled to if not for the error made.
Defendant admitted that the May 6, 1998 Title is entitled to her (Aff. Of Hampton,
Exhibit 17). Defendant gave the figure of $21,185.47 from that figure $42,060.94 (see
Affidavit of Clay Holbrook Exhibit 4).
57.

Also, another Escrow Order ($135,000.00) was given to Plaintiff by Defendant,

which was also, connected to the sale ($200,000.00) which that Escrow order of
$200,000.00 paid the commissions of $12,000.00 dollars and the Escrow order for
$135,000.00 did not (see Affidavit of Clay Holbrook Exhibitl and 2).

58.

Plaintiff can show that an Oral Agreement was in effect, and how Defendants

later manipulated Plaintiff to release all her titled property, approximately 4,200 acres,
for the same amount that was agreed upon in an earlier conversation, for that first Escrow
Order of $200,000.00 dollars, prior to August 14, 2007 file complaint with this Court, for
that house with 6.32 acres for $21,185.47.
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59.

Defendants5 become aware of a filed complaint dated August 14, 2007 and on

August 27, 2007 decided to add a Settlement Agreement to the Disclaimer and a Quit
Claim Deed that was to relinquish Plaintiffs rights to that 6.32 acres and Home which
would then release all her rights to approximately 4,100 aces.

60.

Defendants did agree to $21,185.47 which is approximately half of her share she

lost due to the defendants causing a title error that was unknown to Plaintiff at the time of
the Court order to sell (Sold January 23, 2002) due to a Default Notice on a Bank Loan
with Plaintiff, Defendants are aware of Plaintiffs Joint Tenants since 1993 and several
loans on that property. However, during several conversations between Defendants and
Plaintiff did agree that fraud does exist that involved approximately 4,200 acres. On
August 27, 2007, Defendant had a different out look on the situation and then stated to
the Plaintiff that they are not responsible for all, just the 6.32 acres and willing to take
care of that only. Plaintiff again agreed to what they discuss earlier on that issue but not
to that new Settlement Statement that was a surprise to her that day. Defendant did not
up hold his end and of the Oral Agreement that was now in writing by him and causing
Plaintiff not to sign because of that Settlement Statement. Defendant wanted Plaintiff to
reword her August 14, 2007 complaint. Plaintiff said she would drop the house and 6.32
acres and is willing to settle to what was agreed oa However, Plaintiff had to serve
Defendants5 on December 10, 2007. During these meetings Defendant did not produce
documents in their file; until June 2008, and is the cause of the third amended complaint
that now states fraud.
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DATED thisc&7 day of ZfrW , 200?.

yv 1

e^

pX^ypy

SUBSRIBED AND SWORN to before me this^fday ofOkW, 200?.

My Commission Expires:

h&lo-lllQfz.
NOTARY PUBLIC
KRISTYPRETTYMAN
wisunrMMMBBiOFunN
12 WEST MAIN
PRICE, UTAH 84501
COMM. EXP. 0547-2012
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

130

0004(H)

ADDENDUM 9
Relevant Portions of the Transcript of the Summary Judgment Hearing
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTJ

IfififflPCT-COURIS.

CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-0O0-

TONDA LYNN HAMPTON,
Case No. 070700813

Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
PROFESSIONAL TITLE SERVICE,
Defendant.
-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 21st day of September,
2009, commencing at the hour of 10:12 a.m., the above-entitled
matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE DOUGLAS B.
THOMAS, sitting as Judge in the above-named Court for the
purpose of this cause, and that the following proceedings were
had.
-oOo-

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS
\rr
:J:-.V

°&29 2m

LITIGATION SERVICES
SOUTH RIO GRANDE

S A L T L A K E CITY, UTAH

84101

WWW.DEPOMAXMERIT.COM

TOLL. FREE 800-337-6629
PHONE 8011-328-1188
FAX 801-328-1189
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A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiff:

TONDA LYNN HAMPTON
Appearing Pro Se

For the Defendant:

JUSTIN R. BAER
Attorney at Law
Hirschi, Christensen
138 East South Temple, 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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P R O C E E D I N G S

(Transcriber's Note:

Speaker identification

may not be accurate with audio recordings.)

THE COURT:

Good morning.

We're here on the case of

Tonda Lynn Hampton vs. Professional Title Service and Stewart
Title Guaranty and Clay G. Holbrook.

We have the petitioner--

plaintiff, who is present.
Are you prepared to proceed, ma'am?
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Okay.

Thank you.

We also have the defendant, who is present and
represented by counsel.
MR. BAER:
THE COURT:

You are?

Justin Baer.
Thank you, Mr. Baer.

This is the time set for the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, hearing on that motion.
Are you prepared to proceed as well, Mr. Baer?
MR. BAER:
THE COURT:
MR. BAER:

Yes, your Honor.
Okay.

Go ahead.

You may present your--

Thank you, your Honor.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment requests
summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims brought in the

3
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further lawsuit.

And when plaintiff indicated she was going

to continue the suit and this was only as to one claim, that's
when the settlement agreement was not completed.

And so I

believe that based on these facts, it can be held that there
was no meeting of the minds.
THE COURT:
MR. BAER:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

Thank you.
Ms. Hampton?

Go ahead, you can make

your claim wherever you'd like.
MS. HAMPTON:

Your Honor, I wrote some notes down,

so I'll just read them, if I could.
THE COURT:

Okay.

But I'm going to be listening

very carefully, you need to respond to the claims that have
been made by Mr. Baer today.
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

Respond?
Okay?

MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:
is your time.

Okay.

Should I respond to those now?

Well, however you want to do it.

This

I'll--I don't want to dictate to you how you

must present your claim.
MS. HAMPTON:

Okay.

On the summary judgment, on the

requirements, that it needs to be no dispute to the facts,
entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the law is properly
stated and applied.
And your Honor, this is a case involving the

13
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concealment of an error, a mistake.

The defendants have

eliminated joint tenant ownership of 4,200 acres,
approximately, which are the subject concern in this case.

I

believe defendant only identifies about 681 acres of that,
which to eliminate, to exclude all real estate, all real
property issues with present an incomplete picture.
Since the defendant is not going to move for summary
judgment on plaintiff's total acreage and other claims, should
plaintiff total acreage of 4,200 and her allegations be
excluded, the totality of the circumstances will not be
presented to the trier of fact.
Defendant's claim statute of limitations, then res
judicata.

Res judicata is — is based on the case.

They're

applying it to a common law marriage case, the allegations
within that common law marriage case.
The plaintiff is not seeking her partnership from
these defendants, plaintiff is not seeking a divorce from
these defendants either.

Those are allegations in the cause

of action in the prior cases.
They claim statute of limitations.

And defendant

statutes three years for plaintiff to file; however,
defendants claim she filed after the three years and in the
defendant's claims on July, 2 007, plaintiff questioned two
parcels of land and that's cited in his facts at Page 10, at
No. 36; however, plaintiff claims she began on August 14th,

14

i
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2 006, by certifying a letter to Professional Title Service
addressing one parcel, the 6.32 acres that involved the house,
real property.

That is, both of these statements are within

one year.
Defendants did admit an error pertaining to the
chain of title to that 6.32 acres, the house parcel, that
involving plaintiff's whole real estate soon will become to
light during our conversation after 2007 of contact.
Approximately November of 2 006, Clay Holbrook
approached myself in this courthouse.

Within--anyway, within

the attachment of plaintiff's res--to the respondent's to
summary judgment is a transcript.

In that transcript, there

is conversations where the defendant, on Page 8, he included,
admitted he included the house, he admitted, on Page-THE COURT:
now?

Now, what--what are you referring to,

The-MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

My affidavit.

Okay.

You said transcript, that

wasn't-MS. HAMPTON:

There is a--within the attachment to

plaintiff's response to the summary judgment of defendant is
the transcript.

There-~that was done on August 27th, 2007, at

the offices of Professional Title Service with Clay Holbrook.
THE COURT:

Ma'am, are you saying there's a

transcript of something that's attached to your affidavit?

15

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1^7

MS. HAMPTON:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Okay.

It's Exhibit 25.
You're talking about the August

27th, 2007., meeting?
MS. HAMPTON:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Okay.

And let's just--okay.

And what

is it specifically you're referring to?
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

On Page 6.

Okay.

MS. HAMPTON:

On Page 6 — 1 apologize, these aren't

numbered, but if you go to the mid-mark and a couple
paragraphs down, it will have a, "Clay."

We were discussing

the property.
THE COURT:

Just a moment.

It says "Clay:

(colon)

We were discussing the property-MS. HAMPTON:

Okay.

THE COURT:

This is on Page 6; is that correct?

MS. HAMPTON:

Page 6, towards the bottom, it says—

it's "Clay, you're just releasing u s —
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. HAMPTON:

--because we didn't have—we didn't

do--we're not capa--culpable on the rest of it."
THE COURT:
MS. HAMPTON:

Okay.
The reason for the meeting was to take

care of the six acres and receive the twenty-one-plus dollars
for that, 21,185.47.

16
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And then on Page 8,--on Page 8, half-way mark up
from that is, Clay:

We've included the house.

Through this transcript, he's admitting that he did
include the house by mistake and that he's not culpable for
the rest.
THE COURT:

Well, wait a second, ma'am.

Where are

you at?
MS. HAMPTON:

Okay.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. HAMPTON:

On Page 8, halfway.
I'm on Page 8.

And come up probably four or five or

six, it will say, "Clay, we included the house," pertaining to
the error.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:
that's why.

So, he admits —

Which it says, we included the house and

Okay.

MS. HAMPTON:

--he included the house and this is

why he was, at the time and prior to my filing of the
complaint, he priorly admitted the house for the 21-plus
dollars.

And there's an admission there that he made the

error and this is what led us to--led to the oral agreement
prior; but during this meeting, he--he's trying to get out of
the lawsuit now and we're discussing why we're to take care of
the house only and leave the other issues for the court to
decide.
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THE COURT:

And where does he say that the

settlement agreement is clear for that, ma'am?
I'm looking for.

That's what

Is that the settlement agreement only

applies to the house.
MS. HAMPTON:

The settlement agreement, the reason

why I could not complete our oral agreement, the--on the 6.32
acres for the—for the money amount to exchange and relinquish
my rights, during that meeting, I did read all the documents
and noticed the settlement--settlement agreement was attached
and because of that reason, I could not finish my obligations
either.
THE COURT:

Well, ma'am, what I'm trying to find out

here-MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

Okay.
—your—what is the nature of the

settlement agreement that you believe, what are the terms of
the settlement agreement that you believe?

You thought it was

just for the six-point-some-odd acres?
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

No.

What did you think the settlement

agreement was for?
MS. HAMPTON:

When I read the settlement agreement,

I realized he had found the complaint that I filed and he
added that to our oral agreement, but the oral agreement was
like way before August 8th, but on August 27th, apparently, he
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found the August 14th complaint and I believe the settlement
agreement was attached.
here today.

If I didn't read that, I wouldn't be

I read that and I was totally shocked to see a

settlement agreement of that; why in the world would I agree
to turn over 4,2 00 acres for a lousy twenty-one thousand-plus
dollars?

That was never talked about, never mentioned through

an agreement to settle the house.
THE COURT:

Well, but ma'am, what it has to do with

you is your claims against Mr. Holbrook.
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

Uh huh (affirmative).

And so the question is, is, did you

believe you were relinquishing all of your claims against Mr.
Holbrook as of that date?

Were you relinquishing everything

against Mr. Holbrook in exchange for the twenty-one thousand?
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

Not in the oral agreement.
Okay.

MS. HAMPTON:
acres prior.

We only--we never discussed 4,200

The oral agreement only was a discussion of six

point acres for the $21,000.

That was the oral agreement;

however, so many weeks later, he had found that I filed the
suit, 'cause I had realized that all of this was connect—now
connected and I could find that there was a big mistake.

And

when I filed suit, because of his avoidance, of not keeping up
the oral agreement on a certain date, I applied--I--I filed
the complaint.

But on August 27th, he called me in to take
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care of the oral agreement.
THE COURT:

And he was saying, I want everything

taken care of on—for the payment of 21,000?
MS. HAMPTON:

As I read through, what I thought I

was signing off was just six acres for the $21,000, all of a
sudden, I seen an attached document called settlement
statement agreement and was concerned why he is now applying
this.

This was not part of our oral agreement discussion,

which I believe he attached it because he found the complaint
and thought this was a quick way, if I didn't read it, he'd
slip right through.
THE COURT:

So, the transcript that you have

attached—
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

Uh huh (affirmative).
--just so we're straight on this, are

you suggesting that's a complete transcript of the settlement
meeting?
MS. HAMPTON:

This happened--yes, this is a complete

transcript of that one day, when I realized—
THE COURT:

Of the August 27th one?

MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

Of the August 27th—

But after that, you'd already filed.

So, this is the one where it broke down, basically where you
realized that he was wanting to settle more, but this was not
your original discussion transcript?
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MS. HAMPTON:

This was not our original agreement,

no, which was an oral agreement for the house only.
And then when I had typed up an agreement, he didn't
like my wording and it was for the house, for the 21,000 and
then, I asked him to do it and then, he never came around the
next day, days go by, I get concerned because I don't know
about an oral agreement, if it's a one-year statute of
limitation, I protected my rights and I filed that complaint
immediately.

Did not serve him, in case he was to continue to

take care of--of his obligation, compensate for his error.
But on August-THE COURT:

So, you wanted to collect the $21,000

and then still turn around and sue him for the 4,200 acres?
Is that essentially-MS. HAMPTON: We-THE COURT:

--what you wanted to do?

MS. HAMPTON:
to August 27th.

--we had discussed all of this prior

Both of us had realized there was a big

error, I did not receive any documents; however, the
defendants avoided giving me any documents, but stated, we'll
take care of one--basically, we'll take care of the house
first.

And that's why I came down August 27th, to take care

of the house.
THE COURT:

Ma'am, what I'm trying to find out is,

what do you believe the terms were of this settlement
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agreement?

And what is —
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

In the oral —
— a n d what do you base those terms on?
--in the oral —
I'm trying to find out whether there was

a meeting of the minds on that settlement—proposed settlement
agreement.
MS. HAMPTON:

Okay.

The oral agreement, we had

meeting of the minds, it was, just, he had to draw up the
document 'cause he didn't like mine.
THE COURT:

Okay.

What were the terms, do you

believe?
MS. HAMPTON:

The terms were t o — I would relinquish

my rights, basically, it was all stated on a document he typed
up, everything was legit on August 27th, so all those terms in
that August 27th disclaimer, I believe would be correct, to my
belief, and it's all listed in the disclaimer.

Those are the

terms where I would relinquish my rights to the error of title
of 6.31 acres for the value of—consideration of 21,185.47.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, wait a second here.

Do

you—
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

Those—
--have you attached that document?
It's in def endant' s —
Okay.

But you're saying that that
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document was accurate?
MS. HAMPTON:

The disclaimer is accurate.

typed up, for the 6.32 acres, that was accurate.

He had

But the

trick, and I can't find another word for it, was, he attached
settlement statement agreement that we never once discussed,
prior.
THE COURT:

Well, so, ma'am, when you say the

disclaimer agreement, I — I'm trying to sort out what it is
you're talking about.

You need to help me out here and refer

to me exactly what it is you're referring to, because this is
the critical issue for me, is whether or n o t —
MS. HAMPTON:

Okay.

THE COURT:

-—there is a reasonable basis to find

there is a disputed fact regarding the existence of an oral
contract.

And—and I'm looking to see what you believed the

terms of the oral contract were and where that—where that
document is--is--why you believe those terms are accurate, the
basis for what you believe those terms are.
MS. HAMPTON:

The basis, he agreed to pay the money

to relinquish my rights of my titled ownership that the
company erred in.

I don't believe I have the--a document to

show that at this time.
THE COURT:

Okay.

So, there's no document that

shows what the terms of that agreement were; is that correct?
MS. HAMPTON:

Not at this time—
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THE COURT:

Well, this is--

MS. HAMPTON:

--to show--

THE COURT:
time.

--the time, ma'am, there's not any other

This is the now.

Do you have an agreement that shows

the existence of those terms?
MS. HAMPTON:

Defendants typed up the agreement, I

don't have that agreement, but it did not match--the August
27th meeting was totally changed to our terms of an oral
agreement, to relinquish my rights of six acres only for
$21,000, which was an escrow order that they erred in.

That

is an oral agreement and since that did not ever happen, I had
to file a complaint to save my rights for trial.
THE COURT:

Ma'am, what do you--what do you believe

the term--what are you asserting the terms were of the oral
agreement?
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

When you say "terms", could y o u —

Yeah.

In other words, the terms of a

contract would be, you know, the--the things that go to the
heart of the agreement.

In other words, there would be a

payment, you allege, of twenty-one thousand some-odd dollars
in exchange for what?

What--what--what were the terms of the-

-of the oral agreement from your perspective?
MS. HAMPTON:

He would pay me the $21,185.47 to

relinquish my rights to a deed of 6.32 acres.
discussion and an agreement we came to.
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That was a

THE COURT:
rights to a deed?

So, it was—it was totally to relinquish

That's all it was?

MS. HAMPTON:

To relinquish my rights to a deed, one

deed of 6.32 acres.
THE COURT:

Okay.

So, essentially, your oral

agreement was the payment would be made to relinquish the
rights in land.

Is that what you're--

MS. HAMPTON:

Yes.

THE COURT:

--is that what you're telling me?

MS. HAMPTON:

It was land, real property.

THE COURT:

So, ma'am, is it your assertion that it

was not in the nature of a settlement agreement?
MS. HAMPTON:

No.

THE COURT:

It was not in the nature of a settlement

agreement?
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:
interest in land.

No. The--

But rather was for payment for an

Is that what you're asserting?

I want to

make sure I understand this, ma'am.
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

Correct.
Okay.

All right.

Thank you.

Go ahead.
MS. HAMPTON:

And go back to—I'm not sure I left

off, the statute of limitations, defendant's claim.

And back

to the defendants did admit an error pertaining to the chain
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of title that involved the 6.32 acres.

He admitted that on

November, 2 0 06.
The defendant never did supply their findings to--to
myself and how they came up and acknowledged the error;
however, all the above statements are within a three-year
statute of limitation and therefore, it cannot be artificially
separated from the overall claims and the newly--newly
discovered evidence.

The defendant's method used demonstrates

their wrong involve (sic) for—for an example, defendant's
claim on the two-parcel house and the vacant, which is 6.32
acres and 675 acres, that sold—did sell in 2002, which that
total acreage is 681 acres-. That leaves 3,400 acres that are
at issue as well.
I will — the continuance of the wrong--of the error
of the title company as of 2000--2008, all of the real estate
has now sold in different sections and I'm still gathering
documents on that.
The last portion—portion of property was a hundred
acres that sold for 125,000.

Again, my name was not attached

to my titles when it sold and that came to my attention during
the year, I think it was closer to 2008, February; however,
the doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of
limitations.

As a result, during discovery stage, defendants

produced hundreds of documents, nine hundred-plus, at
different days and times, is when I discovered the chain of
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title error in the year 2008, involving all of the Carbon
County real property.
The evidence for trial is now in black and white.
The alterations of certain documents within the defendant's
files is concealed, was not even available public records.
In short, your Honor, on a summary judgment motion
or the jury should make one determination as a result of the
'defendant's actions that involve all the plaintiff's real
estate, property, due to their error and. continued actions to
conceal, misrepresent, mislead myself.

What I mean by that

is, in 2007, he agreed to start paying for his errors,
compensate, starting with the 6.32 acres that was just
discussed.
THE COURT:
asked about.

Well, but~~but ma'am, that's what I just

You said that, when he agreed to pay, he was just

paying you for the deed, that was--I asked you that
specifically, whether that was in the nature of a settlement
agreement or whether that was for the purchase of the land.
And you indicated that it was for the deed.
MS. HAMPTON:

There is an existing deed, today, that

said I have ownership of that 6.32 acres.

There is a deed

right now that I have, but—however, because of the chain of
title, it really doesn't exist.

This is why he wanted that

deed in exchange for the $21,000, to cover up the error.
THE COURT:

Ma'am, I — I'm still trying to focus
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down--come back to this $21,000.
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

Okay.

And--and you have told me that what you

were paying the $21,000 for was essentially--or he was paying
the $21,000, was for you to relinquish your rights in the
property, that it in essence was not as—in fact, I asked you
specifically, was it a settlement agreement?

You said no, it

was not, it was for the rights to the property and that deed.
Is that correct?
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

Correct.

All right.

MS. HAMPTON:

And I'm not sure if any law warrants

their actions for concealment, but all of the issues for years
have been totally concealed, never exposed, never once, no one
came to me and said, hey, there was an error.

Through all of

my research, continuing, trying to find the error, and then
now this suit, is the only time I received any documents from
the files is through the discovery stage, to expose what
really happened.

And the doctrine of fraudulent concealment

will toll the statute to where the defendant, if they did
conceal, mislead, should be applied.
And was there any other questions that I haven't
answered?
THE COURT:

I don't believe so, ma'am.

Mr. Baer?
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Thank you.

MR. BAER:

Your Honor, if I may, just one more point

regarding this oral agreement.

Paragraph 12 of Ms. Hampton's

affidavit, it's on Page 3 of her affidavit, she says, We both
agreed to half of 42,000, approximately, the remainder of what
escrow order of 200,000.
Paragraph 13, Holbrook requested that I draw up the
agreement, I did, and delivered it to the office of
Professional Title Services.

The agreement is attached to my

affidavit as Exhibit 8.
Exhibit 8 to her affidavit has a Bate stamp of
PTS662.
So, the document that was provided to the defendant
by plaintiff is titled Settlement Agreement, it references
this 6.32 acres and then has a general irelease at the end,
Paragraph 2, called release.

Hampton hereby completely

releases, acquits, forever discharges Professional Title
Services.
And so, when they met on August 27th, the defendant
had discovered this lawsuit and wanted the lawsuit dismissed
as part of the agreement and she said, this agreement is only
for the six acres.
So, this—this document that was prepared by the
plaintiff demonstrates that it was a settlement of disputed
claims.

And so, when the defendant discovered that there was

a lawsuit, she was planning on proceeding with a lawsuit,
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that's, I believe the facts in evidence demonstrate that there
was no meeting of the minds regarding this agreement.
THE COURT:
MR. BAER:

Okay.

Thank you.

MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

Could I respond to that?
If you have something to respond to

that, ma'am, I'll let you.
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Go ahead.

On that agreement he refers to--

Uh huh (affirmative).

MS. HAMPTON:

— o f the 6.32 acres was at the time of

my knowledge of the error in that property, the other wasn't
discussed or realized until further investigation of the total
acreage, which then, on August 14th is when I decided I needed
to file a complaint, because this involved more than 6.32
acres.

But that agreement that I'd drawn up was prior to my

knowledge of all acreage and even pointing the finger at the
defendants, which would relinquish the rights to that 6.32
acres for that dollar amount, that was all that was in that
document, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

I have reviewed very carefully the pleadings the
parties have filed.

In my mind, I did have a question with

respect to the existence of a dispute regarding the terms of
an oral contract; however, I believe those issues have been
resolved in my mind at today's hearing.
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Let me indicate my thinking on that.

With respect

to all of the underlying claims, these have--the--the
defendant has shown in the briefing that these claims
essentially have all had an opportunity to be litigated in--in
prior actions.

And--and the reason why that becomes important

is whether or not it's been determined whether or not the
plaintiff had any interest in those properties, and if she had
no interest in those properties because they were previously
extinguished in prior litigation, then in fact, she would have
no basis to come back to Professional Title Services for their
work.
So, for the reasons set forth in the defendant's
memoranda, I do find that the doctrine of res judicata does,
in fact, apply and I am persuaded by that.
Similarly, I also believe the, as a separate
grounds, I also believe the statutes of limitations arguments
apply.
The big question in my mind had to do, as I've
i

indicated, with the existence of an oral contract.

And the

question in my mind is whether or not there was an oral
contract or a settlement agreement in which the parties now
are disputing the terms, or whether, in fact, it was some
other form of agreement.
The plaintiff has, today, clarified for the Court in
her testimony in response to my questioning, on numerous
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occasions—numerous occasions, that she believed that she was
purchasing, essentially--or she wasn't purchasing, she was
surrendering an interest in real estate through that oral
contract.

And that, in fact, the money would be paid and the

deed would be conveyed.
I believe that that argument is barred by the
statute of frauds, specifically Utah Code Annotated Section
25-5-1.

No estate or interest in real property other than

leases for a term not exceeding one year, and that's not what
we're dealing with here, nor any trust or power over
concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared
otherwise than by act or operation of law or by deed or
conveyance in writing, subscribed by the party creating,
.granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
It appears to me that what we've got is the
plaintiff now asserting that she was conveying an interest in
property in a deed in exchange for the twenty-one thousand.
As a consequence, that is a contract for the sale of property,
sale of land.

By law, it is required to be in writing, there

cannot be an oral--an oral enforcement of that claim or an
oral contract for that claim.
So, as a consequence, the Court finds that her claim
for an oral agreement for sale of land is, in fact,
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unenforceable as a matter of law and barred by the Utah
statute of frauds contained in 25-5-1.
As a consequence, the Court cannot find that there
was any oral contract of settlement; in fact, in—as I
questioned--or a dispute regarding the contract of settlement;
and in fact, as I questioned the plaintiff as to whether there
was a n — a contract for settlement that was at issue, she
specifically indicated no.
Accordingly, I'm granting the defendant's motion for
summary judgment in full and would ask Mr. Baer to please
correct the--prepare the paperwork and to please include the
analysis that's utilized under the separate claims as part of
the Court's justification for the order, because I am, in
fact, adopting those as separate, independent justifications
for granting the motions for summary judgment.
MS. HAMPTON: . Your Honor, is that the final?
THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am.

MS. HAMPTON:

What about the concealed fraud

argument in the third complaint?
THE COURT:
ruling today.

Ma'am, I — I have—I have issued my

When you say the concealed fraud argument, my

point here, ma'am, is that your interest has already been
extinguished as against—in these properties in prior
litigation.
MS. HAMPTON:

Excuse me.

They weren't extinguished,
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they were fraudulently concealed and erred in title-THE COURT:

But they were--they were presented

before a Court-MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

No, they were not, your Honor.
I—again, I'm going through the

information that has been provided and the documents that were
provided by the defendant in this case and it would appear
that they were in fact, that-MS. HAMPTON:

Your Honor, they're incomplete

documents and hearsay.
THE COURT:

Well, but, ma'am, are you suggesting

that there--the prior court orders have not in fact ruled on
these claims?
MS. HAMPTON:

They did not rule on my property

issues, they ruled on a common law marriage and I-THE COURT:

But as part of that common law marriage,

they, in fact, issued a--an appropriate property decree in
terms of allocating the division of property, did they not?
Mr. Baer, am I wrong on that?
MR. BAER:

I believe that they did and following

lawsuits in 2002, '3 and '4, also adjudged those claims.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

There were also additional claims

in those later lawsuits, were there not, having to do with
these properties, as I read your-MR. BAER:

Yes, there were.
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THE COURT:

--briefs and as I read the orders on

those later claims.
MS. HAMPTON:

That is not true, your Honor, it's

incomplete documents and they're alluding off findings of fact
and it does not state facts.

It will state the common law

marriage and I'm not entitled to my partner, which was my exhusband, I'm not entitled to his portion of the property.
That does not say that I cannot have my joint tenant property.
This is joint tenant property in discussion, those titles are-are joint property.
THE COURT:

But—but ma'am, but ma'am, were they-~I

want to give you every opportunity here, I don't want to cut
you off, but I'm suggesting to you that, as I reviewed the
defendant's motion and memorandum supporting motion for
summary judgment, specifically, ultimately, the Court
dismissed plaintiff's 1999--well,* let's get down to the
statement of undisputed fact.

Okay.

We have all of those facts that have been listed and
I would point out, ma'am, that you have not met your burden
that is required in terms of responding appropriate to the—
appropriately, as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure to
these--to these affi~-or to these statements of fact.
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

On who?

Prior cases?

No, ma'am, as required for you to

respond to the memorandum in support of motion for summary
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judgment, specifically the statement of undisputed fact.
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

Is that these defendants?

Yes.

MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

What if I agree to all of them?

You agreed to every one of these facts.

MS. HAMPTON:

Okay.

So, I agreed to them, your

Honor, but, however, that's not the issues of this case, that
is not the subject matter or the issues to this case.

Those

prior cases involved a divorce, just a divorce, and the final
ruling was that no common law exist and the next is release
lis pendens.

Those lis pendens were on joint property.

It

never did say all the property goes to the defendant, any
defendant, in any of those prior cases.

They claim res

judicata on marriage and I'm not entitled to the defendant's
portion, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Well, you will — I'm going to let you,

Counsel, kind of go through and--and let's kind of summarize
this for her so she has a good understanding, I want to give
her every opportunity with respect to these statement of
facts, because as I went through, I was--I was persuaded that
in fact, there was no statement of fact with respect to these
parcels of property because they had, in fact, been resolved
through prior litigation.
Counsel?
MR. BAER:

Your Honor, Exhibit M to the defendant's
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memorandum in support of the motion for summary judgment is a
complaint filed in 2004.

There are the allegations of this

complaint, Paragraph 5, I, plaintiff, on information and
belief, allege the defendant, who is Kim Jensen and Mr.
Jensen's attorney, has a breach of fiduciary duty.

The trust

account regarding an interest-bearing account of this 2 002
sale no longer exists.
And then she goes on, I believe my joint partner
defendant has now sold all of our other Carbon County real
estate as of approximately 2 004, once deeded in both
plaintiff's and defendant's names, approximately 3,200 acres.
The record will show that somehow a limited liability company
sold our real estate interests.
Paragraph 10, defendant's true records will show
that petitioner was never given any oral or written documents
to allow any ownership change on approximately 4,000 acres,
which are at issue.
And--and so this, I believe that this complaint, the
2 004 complaint, it summarizes, because then there's a motion
to dismiss based on res judicata that walks through the
previous lawsuits attached as various complaints and the order
from the Court does say that these issues were previously
adjudicated.
THE COURT:

And—and that, essentially, is what—

where my focus has been, ma'am.

Again, it goes to the fact of
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whether or not you had any right, title and interest in this
property.

You can't go against the title company if you have

no right, title and interest as determined by prior court
order.

And it would appear to me that these interests have

been determined by prior court orders in your litigation with
Mr. Jensen.
MS. HAMPTON:

Your Honor, I have no interest to the

portion of Mr. Jensen's property in the common law divorce
case.

He had no right to my portion either.
THE COURT:

But ma'am, the—what I'm suggesting to

you is that those prior cases have resolved the issue of who
owned the property.
MS. HAMPTON:

I do not see a court—final court

order, judgment, saying that my property, joint property is to
go to Mr. Jensen.
THE COURT:

Well, what I'm suggesting to you is, it-

-it appears to me that the issue of these lands, okay, the
property and these lands has previously been decided, this
real property has previously been decided in prior litigation
and--and that, I believe, is what Mr. Baer was referring to.
Did that not have to do with litigation surrounding these
properties?
MR. BAER:

Yes, it did.

MS. HAMPTON:

The litigation was that the defendant,

Kim Jensen, did not want his portion separated, half to me,
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Those were what litigated and they--you don't have a full
document or--of the case to show all that.

The final order

doesn't state in detail any of that property-THE COURT:

But it dismissed your claims to those

properties, ma'am, I believe.
Did it not, Counsel?
MR. BAER:

Yes.

THE COURT:

It--it--in other words, it conclusively

dismissed your claims to the properties, by conclusively
dismissing your claim, your assertion to that property, ma'am,
it means that you did not have any right, title or interest to
those properties.
MS. HAMPTON:

This is why I went to the Professional

Title Service, to find out why.

The case of 2004, that was

served in September, 2 004, finally in 2006 was dismissed
because somebody kept telling me I have no interest, so I
contacted Clay Holbrook.

This is where we started to have

agreements.
THE COURT:

But--but what I'm suggesting to you,

ma'am, is that your time to litigate that claim, okay, if you
believed that you had a right, title and interest underlying
to that property, your claim--your time to litigate that claim
was back in those prior lawsuits.

You were dismissed out,

'cause that--you had made those claims to those parcels of
property and the Court found that you—and dismissed your
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lawsuit and essentially found that you had no right, title or
interest to those parcels.
Now, that's my understanding of those prior cases.
If I'm wrong, Mr. Baer, please correct me.
MR. BAER:

That's my understanding as well.

THE COURT:

So, essentially, ma'am, if you--if a

Court has previously ruled that you have no right, title or
interest to those properties, if you have no right, title or
interest to those properties as established by a prior court
order, then those issues are settled.

You can't turn around

and then sue Mr. Holbrook on an underlying claim that you do
have a right, title and interest, when a court has already
determined that you have no such right, title or interest to the property.
MS. HAMPTON:

Mr. Jensen claimed in those complaints

that I did not have a right to his interest.

I don't see a

document where it says I do not--I don't have right to title.
THE COURT:

I believe, ma'am, that's what those

cases were about.
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

I don't.see those documents—

That's--

MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

--right to title.
That's—it's my understanding, ma'am,

that in fact, your claims to those properties were, in
essence, distinguished.

Now, do the orders specify, Mr. Baer,
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are you aware of--as to whether she was awarded any right,
title or interest in those properties?
MR. BAER:

She was not.

My understanding of those

lawsuits was there were very similar allegations to this suit,
the ones that I read in that 2 000 suit--2 004 suit, were
regarding transferring properties out of her name and
fraudulently concealing different types of things and those
cases were all ruled against her.
THE COURT:

And that was my understanding as I

reviewed them and reviewed--went through all of them.

I just

wanted to make sure that my understanding is--is accurate.
Ma'am, it appears to me that those claims have all
been made, you've already gone through substantial litigation
on those claims.
MS. HAMPTON:

The only part was the common law,

there was a lis pendens put on my property to protect it, the
very first one was my interest property.

Because of the fraud

and I pled fraudulent doctrine--the doctrine of fraudulent
concealment is what led me to Mr. Holbrook.

I was unaware of

the fraud that was committed and that tolls the-statutes, even
if it's nine, ten, twenty years later, it tolls the statutes
when there's concealed fraud.

This is what's happened through

all of these litigations and never once did this company come
to me and tell me, there's an error, this property is being
sold, I'm doing title research, there's an error.
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That was

all concealed from everybody.
I don't see a court order specifically saying that
my title I have no interest to.
THE COURT:
before me today.

But quite frankly, ma'am, that is not

That issue's not before me; in other words,

this is not a quiet title action.
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

No.
This—this is an action against Mr.

Holbrook.
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Okay.

And essentially, what I have done

is, I've found against you on your claims against Mr.
Holbrook.
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

For him concealing in his error?
I — I have—I have found, based upon the

fact that those issues had already been resolved, that--that
the--that the issues that you have litigated in this case were
substantially litigated in prior—in prior cases.
MS. HAMPTON:

Your Honor, I believe that's false.

I

had never once, and if it was, I wouldn't be here today,
because it would have been resolved with those issues.
totally hidden and concealed.

It was

This is an issue of fraud

against a title company, not going from a common law marriage
and after my ex-husband's portion of the joint property,
that's not--
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THE COURT:

But, ma'am--

MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

--what's litigated.

But ma'am, there was later litigation

other than the common law marriage.
MS. HAMPTON:

2004, there was suspicion of fraud, I

didn't know how to get it.
THE COURT:

But it was—it was alleged at that time,

ma'am, and it was dismissed, the claim was raised, you raised
the claim and the case was dismissed at that time.

You cannot

turn around and raise the same claims later in a different
litigation.
MS. HAMPTON:

I tried, through that litigation,

through the 2004, the dismissal of 2006, I tried to obtain
documents from the title company, certified letter sent
several times, avoidance.

That's concealment.

Avoidance.

He

did not produce; however, they dismissed, this is when he
entered and say, I will take care of it, there is an error, I
figured he was, by now, I know he was avoiding, 'cause I could
have appealed i t —
THE COURT:

But--but ma'am--

MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

--he prevented me a cause of action.

Ma'am, I--I'm convinced that I've—I'm.

persuaded by the defendant's arguments in this case.

I

believe that you did have an opportunity in that prior
litigation to raise those claims and in fact, did raise those
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claims-MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

— i n the prior litigation.

MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

I was prevented--

—your Honor.

You--you did, in fact, raise those

issues at that time, ma'am, and so I'm simply suggesting that
for the reason that it has already been decided and further,
that the statute of limitations has run, I am granting the
motion for summary judgment as presented by the defendant in
their-MS. HAMPTON:

Even on fraudulent concealment

doctrine?
THE COURT:

Yes, ma'am.

I--I am, on that, because I

believe those documents do in fact show that you were making
similar claims back in that prior litigation.

You're

indicating that you couldn't find things back then, but the
point is, is, you should have moved forward in that prior
litigation to obtain that information.
MS. HAMPTON:

Your Honor, in that last one, it was

pertaining to 601--81 acres, an interest-bearing trust account
that was gone.

That's what that case was about.

THE COURT:

Ma'am, thank you for coming today and

that'll be the order of the Court.
Would you prepare the order, Mr. Baer?
MR. BAER:

Yes.

Thank you, your Honor.
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THE COURT:
MS. HAMPTON:
THE COURT:

Thank you.
Thanks, your Honor.
Thank you both for coming today.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)
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